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INTRODUCTION

This is an appeal from the decision of the First District Court of Appeals for case number 99-01-CV-3PO. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Madison County Circuit Court, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant in Harry P. Wolf v. HackLibrary Inc., but
affirms on different reasoning than that of the lower court. 1
There are two issues in this appeal. The first is whether an online
archivist who saves and makes available a hacked web page is the information content provider, or is immune as an internet service provider
under 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act. 2 The second issue on
appeal is whether access to an archive containing the hacked web site is
an invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts, or a mere
3
reproduction of previously publicized newsworthy material.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The following facts are agreed upon by both parties. 4 ChiPost.com is
the World Wide Web site of The Chicago Post, a daily newspaper.5 The
website contains headlines and articles from the Post, along with advertisements, community information, and other material. 6 On January 15,
1999, ChiPost.com was "hacked" by one or more persons who identified
themselves as the "MP3 TERRORISTZ." 7 The hackers replaced the
newspaper's web site with a single web page containing sexually explicit
images and language, a rambling diatribe against copyright laws and
intellectual property in general, and an angry denunciation of attorneys
and executives in the music industry.8
The HTML source code for the hacked web page contained additional material which was encoded as comments and therefore not normally displayed by most web browsers. 9 This additional material (set
forth in Appendix A) included condescending and critical statements
about two prominent executives in the music industry, along with personal information pertaining to these executives. 10
Bennett Sirius, ChiPost.com's system administrator, discovered the
hack within three hours and immediately took the site offline in order to
1.
2.
3.
4.

Record ("R") at 2.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996). See R2.
See R3.
Id.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. SeeR3.

10. Id.
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restore its intended contents and to close the security hole which had
made the hack possible." The site normally receives thousands of visitors each hour, although no access statistics were kept during the period
12
that the hacked version was online.
HackLibrary Inc., a Marshall corporation, is the publisher of HackLibrary, a web site containing "hacker news and information"-primarily information about successful hacker exploits. 13 HackLibrary includes
14
an archive where visitors can view copies of various hacked web sites.
The archive bears a disclaimer stating that the copies of hacked sites are
made available solely for purposes of academic research and public information.' 5 Advertising banners appear on most pages within HackLibrary, except for the hacked web site pages in the archive, and
6
HackLibrary is financed by advertising revenues.'
The HackLibrary archive includes copies of more than two hundred
different hacked web sites. 17 In some instances, HackLibrary's own employees download a copy of a hacked site for inclusion in the archive; in
other cases, the hackers themselves or other Internet users provide
HackLibrary with a copy of the hacked site via e-mail (usually without
identifying themselves to HackLibrary).' 8 HackLibrary has no formal
policy for determining which hacked sites to include in its archive,
although only very minor sites are likely to be excluded. 19 Many Internet users who view hacked sites in HackLibrary's archive find them
by browsing the archive out of curiosity or academic interest, although
others reach individual pages within the archive directly, often by means
20
of a web search engine.
There are several similar hacked-site archives on the web, including
AntiOnline, Hacked Sites Dot Coin, Hacker News Network, and 2600.21
There is considerable overlap among these archives, but only HackLibrary includes a copy of the "MP3 TERRORISTZ" version of ChiPost.com. 22 HackLibrary obtained the copy on January 15, 1999, and
made it available in its archive on January 18, 1999.23
Harry P. Wolf is General Counsel for MoneyMusic, Inc., a prominent
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See R4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See R4.
Id.
Id.
See R5.
Id.
Id.

Id.

184

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVIII

24
publisher of popular music, also incorporated in the State of Marshall.
During the months following the hack, Wolf was repeatedly subjected to
various forms of harassment. 2 5 He received numerous e-mail messages
on his personal Lakeforestnet account and calls to his home telephone
number at all hours of the night, the gist of which was roughly
equivalent to the contents of the hacked ChiPost.com site.2 6 In particular, the e-mail messages and telephone calls insulted Wolf and ridiculed
27
his handling of his personal and financial affairs.
In April 1999, Wolf learned that a copy of the hacked ChiPost.com
28
Wolf
site was still available on the web in the HackLibrary archive.
immediately informed HackLibrary of the harassment and asked that
the copy of the hacked ChiPost.com site be removed from the archive, or
that HackLibrary at least redact the references to him contained in the
HTML source code, in order to reduce the likelihood that he would be
subjected to further harassment. 29 HackLibrary responded that it was
merely saving copies of sites that had already been publicly displayed on
the web and refused to remove the hacked ChiPost.com site from its
30
archive.
Wolf brought suit against HackLibrary for invasion of privacy, alleging that he has suffered damages as a result of HackLibrary's public disclosure of private facts concerning Wolf.3 1 HackLibrary subsequently
moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) under 47
U.S.C. § 230(c), HackLibrary cannot be treated as the publisher of
hacked web sites created by other persons; and (2) the publication is not
actionable as an invasion of privacy because the information was already
32
publicly available and is the subject of legitimate public concern.

The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon Section 230(c), holding that HackLibrary was immune
from liability as an interactive computer service provider. 33 The Appellate Court found Section 230(c) inapplicable; though it believed that
HackLibrary was the provider of the materials that it selected for its
archives, it affirmed the summary judgment on the grounds that the information had already been published. Accordingly, the claim failed to
meet the required elements to establish a prima facia case for public dis24. Id.

25. Id.
26. See R5.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. See R6.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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4
closure of private facts.3

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the provider of an online archive of previously published
information can be considered the publisher of that information, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), and therefore not within the Act's immunity.
Whether the information on the displayed hacked site constitutes a
public disclosure of private facts, or a reproduction of already published
and public newsworthy material.
IV.

A.

BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNET

One of the most frequently cited cases for an explanation of the Internet and definitions regarding various mechanisms used on the Internet is ACLU v. Janet Reno. 3 5 The Internet is described as a "giant
network which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks... thus a network of networks."36 In order to access the
Internet, one may use a computer with a modem or a computer that is
directly connected to a computer network that allows access to the Internet. 37 Various online services such as America Online, CompuServe
and Prodigy offer nationwide computer networks that allow access to the
vast amount of material within their own computer networks.38 In addition, most of these online services allow for users to link to the larger
resources of the Internet. 3 9 These online service providers are commonly
referred to as Internet Access Providers. 40
Once a person has gained access to the Internet, there are various
means of "communication and information exchange over the network."4 1 One of these methods includes remote information retrieval
such as the World Wide Web ("the Web"). 4 2 The Web is a "series of documents stored in different computers all over the Internet."43 Many organizations and corporations, such as the Chicago Post, have "home pages"
34. See R7.
35. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (providing an in-depth discussion on the Internet, although not fact specific to this case); aft'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
36. Id. at 831. For additional information on how the Internet works, see Shea v.
Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D. N.Y. 1996); U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir.

1998).
37.
38.
39.
40.

ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 832.
See id. at 833.
See id.
See id.

41. Id. at 834.
42. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
43. See id. at 836.
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on the Web that are treated as one of these documents stored in different
computers.4
In order to make the information available for most users, the Web
uses a specific formatting language called the hypertext markup language ("HTML"). 4 5 Thus, most programs that "browse" the Web have
the capability of displaying HTML documents containing images and
text. 46 In order to retrieve the document the user requests to view,
browsers, such as Internet Explorer, or Netscape Navigator, transmit a
request for that particular HTML document to the Web server. 4 7 When
the document requested is received, the browser processes (or "translates") the HTML codes in the document and the results, which may in48
clude text, images, or sounds, are displayed.
When ChiPost.com was hacked, the HTML codes were altered by the
hackers, which resulted in different output than what was intended by
ChiPost.com. 49 All the web browsers use basic HTML code and they display the content of that code by translating the code into readable information. When those who clicked on the hacked site for ChiPost.com
received the translated document from the web browser, the output of
the HTML source code did not display the offensive information which
was put by the hackers in comments in the code. 50 The source code is
available for the user to retrieve and translate him/herself as well,
though normally they do not bother to do so. In this case, the additional
comments that contained the offensive material regarding Harry Wolf
were put in comments in the source code by the hackers and would not be
displayed unless the user retrieved and translated the code. 5 1 Only the
particular user would know whether the he/she had retrieved the code.
The question here is not whether the offensive information had been displayed (the facts make it obvious that the comments had been read by
many users), but whether the information had been seen on the defendant's archive rather than on the original hacked ChiPost site. Since liability, and not damages, is at issue here, the plaintiff does not need to
show how many people viewed the archived site's source code in order to
state a claim.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Memorandum of the U. S. in Support of Petition for an Order to Show Cause,
U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV.A. 94-1564, 1997 WL 656528, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 1997).
48. See id.
49. See R3.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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B.

SECTION 230(c) REQUIREMENT FOR IMMUNITY

Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 states as
follows:
"No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by an52
other information content provider."
The interactive computer service is defined by Section 230(f)(2) of
the Act as the following:
"Any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to
the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
53
educational institutions."
The information content provider is defined by Section 230(f)(3) of
the Act as follows:
"Any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation or development of information provided through the Internet or
54
any other interactive computer service."
The present case involves a tort claim of invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts. Section 230(c) comes into play as HackLibrary's defense. 5 5 If HackLibrary can establish that it is not the
information content provider, but merely a provider of an interactive
computer service, the statute would successfully bar the claim. One of
the purposes of Section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 was to overrule any precedents "which have treated such providers
and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their
own ..
-"6 This included overruling Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v- Prodigy
Services Co., where the court held the defendant Prodigy liable as a pub57
lisher of defamatory material.
52. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1996).
53. Id. § 230(f)(2).
54. Id. § 230(f)(3).
55. In ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.Supp. 824 (E.D. Penn. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the
court struck down certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 on First
Amendment grounds, but the sections of the Act involved in this case were not affected.
56. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996).
57. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. May
24, 1995). In Stratton, the plaintiffs sued Prodigy, an interactive service provider, for defamatory comments that were posted by an unidentified party on one of Prodigy's bulletin
boards. Id. The court held that the strict liability standard usually applied to original
publishers of defamatory material also applied to Prodigy. Id. The court reasoned that
Prodigy acted like an original publisher and a distributor because it actively participated in
the screening and editing of the messages posted on its bulletin boards, as well as controlling content on its service. Id.
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Plaintiff will argue that HackLibrary is not immune as a mere user
of an interactive computer service under Section 230(c), but rather fits
the definition of the information content provider because it provided the
information from the hacked site once that site was taken down.5 8 There
are two important precedents that bear on this case; the first is Blumenthal v. Drudge, where the court accepted Section 230(c) as a bar to a
defamation tort claim against Drudge and AOL, an interactive computer
59
service provider."
In Blumenthal, the defendant Drudge had a license agreement with
AOL to make defendant's column, the Drudge Report, available to all
America Online's ("AOL") clients. 60 The terms of the contract included a
fiat monthly royalty payment of $3000 to Drudge from AOL. 6 1 During
the term of the license, Drudge wrote a defamatory column pertaining to
the plaintiff and made it available to AOL clients in accordance with the
license agreement. 62 Under the agreement, Drudge was responsible for
creating, editing, updating and managing the report. 6 3 The applicable
part of that case involves the interactive service computer provider's
(AOL's) motion for summary judgment based on Section 230(c).6 4 The
defendant AOL conceded that Drudge, the original author and co-defendant, was an information content provider and that AOL qualified as an
interactive computer service under the Act. 65 But the plaintiff alleged
that AOL served as an information content provider, as well. 6 6 While
the court said, "... Section 230 does not preclude joint liability for the
joint development of content. . . ," it upheld America Online's (AOL) motion for summary judgment under 230(c), because AOL did not edit or
contribute to the column, and was "nothing more than a provider of an
67
interactive computer service on which the Drudge Report was carried."
The second case is Zeran v. AOL, where a third party posted a false
and offensive hoax advertisement about plaintiff Zeran on an AOL bulletin board. 68 After an abundance of angry and threatening calls to his
home, Zeran discovered the message and informed AOL, who took the
posting down, but refused to post a retraction. 69 Over the next four days,
other postings were placed on AOL bulletin boards by the unidentified
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f)(3).
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id.
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 329.
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third party, and news of the postings were broadcast over the radio. 70
Zeran continued to notify AOL of the subsequent postings and the harassment, and its only response was to inform him that the account of the
individual posting the messages would soon be closed. 7 1 Zeran argued
that Section 230(c) only immunizes an interactive service provider, but is
inapplicable to the liability of a distributor. 72 Zeran claimed that since
he notified AOL of the defamatory postings, it is liable as a distributor,
and not immune as the publisher under 230(c).7 3 Zeran was using the
term "distributor" to refer to such intermediaries as bookstores and
newsstand operators.
The Zeran court said,
.. once a computer service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a traditional publisher.
The computer service provider must decide whether to publish, edit, or
withdraw the posting. In this respect, Zeran seeks to impose liability on
AOL for assuming the role
for which 230 specifically proscribes liabil74
ity-the publisher role.
In effect, the court said that AOL was both a publisher and a service
provider and thus was within the immunity that the act provided. The
court was undertaking to expand the Section to provide immunity to service providers who had notice of offensive content because "notice liability" would impose a burden on them in two ways: (1) "... .they would have
a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon notification,
whether the contents were defamatory or not," and (2) "More generally,
notice-based liability for interactive computer service providers would
provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future
lawsuits" by simple notice of alleged defamatory content.
Wolf may argue that unlike AOL in Zeran, HackLibrary refused to
take down the information after receiving notice of its defamatory content, and Wolf is not seeking to impose a duty by the service provider to
75
actively monitor and prevent such postings.
Wolf may also argue that under Blumenthal, HackLibrary would
qualify as an information content provider because it consciously selected the hacked site for inclusion in its archive based upon a subjective
evaluation of its content and continued to republish it after being advised of its problematic nature. Further, the information would not continue to be available but for defendant's archive.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 332.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332-333.
See R6.
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RIGHT TO PRIVACY

History of Right to Privacy

In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis introduced the legal
theory of a right to privacy in a law review article entitled The Right to
Privacy.76 In this article, Warren and Brandeis drew parallels between
property rights, such as copyrights, and an individual's right to privacy, 77 which they characterized as an individual's "right to be let
alone."78 Warren and Brandeis discussed the threat that technology
posed to one's right to privacy. 7 9 They noted that "numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house tops."8 0 Note that the
newly-invented technology that alarmed them was the camera.
Dean William Prosser subsequently classified privacy as comprising
four distinct torts: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private
facts, false light portrayal in the public eye, and appropriation of one's
image or likeness.8 1 Prosser's classification of privacy rights was
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.8 2 Harry P. Wolf alleges
public disclosure of private facts.
2. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
To be liable for the tort of public disclosure of private facts, one must
give "publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another."8 3 In
addition, the matter that is publicized must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and not of "legitimate concern to the public."84 There is
a distinction between publication and publicity.8 5 Publicity requires
76. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193

(1890).
77. Id. at 213 ("The principle which protects personal writings and other productions of
the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this protection to the personal
appearance, sayings, acts, and to personal relation, domestic or otherwise.").
78. Id. at 195.
79. See id. (referring to the invention of the camera as a new and potentially threatening technological advancement because of the inherent intrusiveness of capturing one's
image).

80. Id. at 195.
81. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
82. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977).
83. Id. § 652D (1977).
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of
a kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and is not of legitimate concern to the public.
Id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
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that the matter is made public generally and not merely published to a
third party or small group of people.8 6 The facts must be disclosed to
enough people "that it is certain to become public knowledge."8 7 The
truth of the facts published is not a defense to this privacy tort.
HackLibrary may argue that the information in the archive is
targeted to a specific group-people interested in academic research. 88
HackLibrary may also contend that the advertising banners are purposely left off the hacked web site pages because the archive is not aimed
89
at the public in general.
A fact is deemed to be private if it has never been in "the public
domain,"90 which includes documents that are required to be kept for
public examination. 91
HackLibrary may contend that it is not liable because the information in its archive had been previously published on the ChiPost site or
was already available to the public. For example, court records are public records whether in divorce or bankruptcy court. 9 2 The information
related to his home address, e-mail account, and phone number may also
be argued as public record because that information can be obtained
93
through public sources.
Finally, Wolf will argue that the personal facts involved here are not
of legitimate concern to the public in general. HackLibrary will assert
that they are newsworthy.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D (1986). See also WILLIAM PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 810 (1971). It is not a public disclosure "to communicate the fact to the
plaintiffs employer, or to any individual, or even to a small group." Id.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D cmt. a (1977).
88. See R4. See, e.g., Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App.3d 825 (1976)
(holding that the release of plaintiffs school grades to the scholarship and loan commission
did not amount to a public disclosure because it was not released to the public in general);
but see Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App.3d 265 (1980) (holding that the release of copies of a
letter containing private facts to twenty people was a public disclosure).
89. See R4.
90. Geoff Dendy, Note, The Newsworthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85
Ky. L.J. 147, 151 (1997) (construing Kilgore v. Younger, 640 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1982)); Howard
v. Des Moines Register, 238 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979); Harris v. Easton Publ'g Co., 483 A.2d
1377 (Pa. Super. 1984).
91. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494 (1975). In Cox, the court
allowed the newspaper to publish the name of a rape victim because the name was part of a
public record. Id. at 472. As the court notes, "[tlhere is no liability when the defendant
merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff which is already public.
Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the plaintiffs life which are
matters of public record. ... " Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. C
(Tent. Draft No. 13, Apr. 27, 1967)).
92. See, e.g., Alarcon v. Murphy, 201 Cal.App. 3d 1 (1988) (holding that the issuance of
a divorce decree was a matter of public record and therefore disclosure could not amount to
invasion of privacy).
93. See Appendix A.
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Newsworthiness Defense

The First Amendment protects the publication of private facts that
are considered to be "newsworthy," or in other words, "of legitimate concern to the public." 9 4 In Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,9 5 the plaintiff
brought an action of public disclosure of private facts against the owner
of a television station that broadcast the name of his daughter, a deceased rape victim. 96 The court noted that the publication of private
facts tort claim raised a struggle between privacy rights and the First
Amendment. 9 7 Although the court held that liability may not be imposed when it is a disclosure of facts found in public documents, the court
"impliedly concedes that the press may be liable, in certain circumstances, ... [for] disclosures not arising from public documents."9 8
In Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., the court affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in a medical malpractice case by applying the newsworthiness defense. 9 9 In an attempt to "properly balance
the freedom of the press against the right of privacy," the court noted
that "every fact disclosed in an otherwise truthful newsworthy publication must have some substantial relevance to a matter of legitimate public interest."10 0 In the publication at issue, the plaintiff argued that
including her picture, psychiatric history, and marital life were not relevant to the newsworthy topic of policing failures in the medical profession. 10 1 To determine if the facts are newsworthy, the court said that
there must be either an "independent newsworthiness or any substantial
nexus with a newsworthy topic." 10 2 The court found that these facts
were relevant because her marital life and status, as well as her psychiatric history, were substantially connected to the subject of the article
and linked to the underlying cause of the alleged malpractice 103

94. Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981) (interpreting
Times, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) and Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 1122 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
95. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
96. Id. at 490.
97. Id. at 489.
98. Dendy, supra note 90, at 154.
99. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 308.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 309.

103. Id.

BENCH MEMORANDUM

1999]

APPENDIX A
COMMENTS CONTAINED IN HACKED VERSION OF CHIPOST.COM

POWER BACK TO THE PEOPLE. END THE STEALING OF PUBLIC PROPERTY FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN BY HARRY WOLF,
GENERAL COUNSEL OF MONEYMUSIC, INC., AND CAREY SMITH,
FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF MONEYMUSIC, INC.
MUSIC BELONGS TO THE PEOPLE AND THESE EVIL CAPITALISTS ARE MAKING INSANE AMOUNTS OF MONEY BY
PROHIBITING YOUNG ARTISTS FROM DEVELOPING THEIR OWN
CREATIVE MUSIC. MR. WOLF AND MR. SMITH HAVE USED
THEIR POWER TO PREVENT NEW ARTISTS FROM PUBLICIZING
THEIR MUSIC BY CLAIMING PRIOR OWNERSHIP OF THEIR
WORK BY COPYRIGHTS OF SIMILAR WORKS. AS A RESULT,
THREE SEPARATE, YOUNG STRUGGLING ARTISTS ARE BURIED
IN COURT'S COSTS AND DAMAGES OWED TO THIS FAT LABEL
COMPANY AND ITS FAT CAT EXECUTIVES. HOW CAN ONE OWN
MUSIC THAT HAS NEVER EXISTED BEFORE?
IT'S TIME TO TAKE MATTERS INTO OUR OWN HANDS AND
LET THESE EVIL CAPITALISTS KNOW WHAT'S RIGHT! LETS GET
HARRY AND CAREY!
SINCE MR. HARRY WOLF IS UNDER THE FALSE IMPRESSION
HE CAN CONTROL WHAT LEGALLY BELONGS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN VERSUS WHAT SHOULD BENEFIT HIS POCKET BOOK,
WHY DON'T THE PUBLIC LET HIM KNOW HOW WE THINK! ALLOW US TO FACILITATE YOUR FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF SPEECH. YOU CAN REACH OUR UNLOVED COPYRIGHT ATTORNEY/THIEF OF THE PUBLIC'S MUSIC AT:
MR. HARRY P. WOLF
2120 GREENBAY ROAD
LAKE FOREST, IL 60045
HOME PHONE #: 847-555-0712
HOME EMAIL: HPWOLF@LAKEFORESTNET.COM
BORN: APRIL 4, 1951
SOCIAL SECURITY #: 078-05-1120
AND FOR OUR FAVORITE FOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER OF MONEYMUSIC, INC., WE MUST EXPRESS OUR FEELINGS TO THE MAN WHO STARTED IT ALL. PLEASE CONTACT
THE FAT CAT BOSS AT:
MR. CAREY J. SMITH
123 LAKE ROAD
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EVANSTON, IL 60202
HOME PHONE #: 847-555-4957
HOME EMAIL: CJSMITH@SUBURBNET.COM
BORN: JANUARY 19, 1948
SOCIAL SECURITY #: 745-00-4325
SINCE MR. WOLF HAS BEEN INSENSITIVE IN HIS HANDLING
OF YOUNG ARTISTS IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY, WE FEEL HE IS
DESERVING OF THE PUBLIC KNOWING THIS INFORMATION:
WHILE MR. WOLF IS SO BUSY DESTROYING CAREERS, HIS FAMILY AFFAIRS ARE IN A STATE OF DESTRUCTION AS WELL. MR.
WOLF'S WIFE, DANIELLA LEE WOLF, IS CURRENTLY ACTIVELY
PURSUING A DIVORCE, ALLEGING ABANDONMENT AND SEXUAL INFIDELITY. IN ADDITION TO BEING INCOMPETENT IN
HANDLING HIS PERSONAL FAMILY AFFAIRS, MR. WOLF FILED
FOR BANKRUPTCY IN 1982, JUST THREE YEARS AFTER LAW
SCHOOL. ITS NICE TO KNOW THE INDUSTRY IS BEING DRAINED
BY A FAT CAT CROOK WHO IS INCAPABLE OF HANDLING BOTH
FAMILY AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS!
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD
THAT 47 U.S.C. § 230 OFFERS HACKLIBRARY NO IMMUNITY
FROM LIABILITY FOR POSTING HARRY WOLF'S PRIVATE INFORMATION ON ITS INTERNET ARCHIVE.

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD
THAT HACKLIBRARY WAS NOT LIABLE FOR PUBLICLY DISCLOSING HARRY WOLF'S PRIVATE FACTS UNDER MARSHALL STATE LAW.
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TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
MARSHALL
Petitioner, Harry Wolf, respectfully submits this brief in support of
his request that this Court reverse the decision of the court of appeals.
OPINIONS BELOW
The circuit court's opinion is unreported. The opinion and order of
the First District Court of Appeals (No. 99-01-CV-3PO) is likewise unreported but is contained in the Record on Appeal. (R. at 2-11.)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Statement of Jurisdiction is omitted in accordance with section
1020(2) of the Rules for the Eighteenth Annual John Marshall Law
School Moot Court Competition in Information Technology and Privacy
Law.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The relevant constitutional provisions to the determination of this
action include: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; and
U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. (See Appendix A.)
The following statutory provision is relevant to the determination of
this action: 47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. 1997) (See Appendix B).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

On January 15, 1999, unknown persons who identified themselves as
the "MP3 TERRORISTZ" hacked the World Wide Web page of the CHICAGO POST ("ChiPost.com"), a daily newspaper. (R. at 3.) The newspaper's web page normally contains headlines, articles from the CHICAGO
POST, and advertisements. (R. at 3.) The hackers replaced the newspaper's web page with a single page containing pornographic material and
disparaging remarks about intellectual property law and attorneys employed in the music industry. (R. at 3.) There is no evidence that any
information about Petitioner Harry Wolf was visible on this web page.
Nevertheless, the hacked page's HTML source code contained additional material encoded as "comments." (R. at 3.) This material is not
normally displayed by the majority of Internet browsers. (R. at 3.) The
"comments" included offensive remarks and divulged personal information about Wolf, an attorney employed by MoneyMusic, Inc., a music
publishing enterprise. (R. at 5.)
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The hackers referred to Wolf as a "crook" and a "thief' because
Wolfs exercise of his professional duties had adversely impacted the interests of a group of musicians involved in a copyright dispute with
Wolfs employer. (R. at 10-11.) In apparent retribution to Wolf's exercise
of his professional duties, the hackers declared that Wolf deserved to
have his personal affairs disclosed to the public. (R. at 11.)
Specifically, the hackers disclosed that Wolfs wife was pursuing a
divorce on the grounds of abandonment and sexual infidelity. (R. at 11.)
However, the record does not show that an application for divorce has
ever been filed in a court. The hackers also disclosed that Wolf had filed
for bankruptcy in 1982, three years after his law school graduation. (R.
at 11.)
The "comments" also included Wolf's home and e-mail addresses, telephone number, date of birth, and social security number. (R. at 10.)
The veracity of the factual statements contained in the "comments" is
not disputed. (R. at 3.) In concluding the barrage of statements, however, the hackers also opined that Wolf was "incapable of handling both
family and financial affairs." (R. at 12.)
Three hours after the hacking took place, ChiPost.com's system administrator discovered the intrusion and immediately took the site offline in order to restore it to its legitimate status. (R. at 3-4.) The record
contains no evidence as to the number of visitors who viewed the ChiPost.com hacked page during this three-hour period because no access
statistics were kept. (R. at 4.) Despite the fact that ChiPost.com is expected to receive multiple visitors per hour, the record does not contain
any evidence about the time of day that the hacking took place. (R. at 4.)
Furthermore, most of these visitors could not read Wolfs personal information located in the "comments," because such encoding is not normally
displayed by the majority of web browsers (R. at 3-4.)
That same day, a web site named HackLibrary obtained a copy of
ChiPost.com's hacked page. (R. at 5.) The record does not reflect how
HackLibrary obtained this copy. However, in other instances, HackLibrary's own employees have downloaded a copy of a hacked page, or a
third party has delivered such a copy to HackLibrary via e-mail. (R. at
4.)
HackLibrary is a web site published by HackLibrary Inc., the Respondent in this case. (R. at 4.) HackLibrary contains hacker news as
well as an archive where visitors can view copies of roughly two hundred
hacked web pages. (R. at 4.) It is undisputed that HackLibrary placed
ChiPost.com's hacked page on its archive three days after receiving it, on
January 18, 1999. (R. at 5.) Although the archive bears a disclaimer
stating the hacked pages it displays are available solely for "academic
research" and "public information" purposes, HackLibrary's site contains
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pervasive advertising. (R. at 4.) Indeed, HackLibrary is financed by revenue from these advertisements. (R. at 4.)
Moreover, although there are viewers who find hacked pages by
browsing through the archive out of curiosity, there are also users seeking to directly view specific hacked pages on the archive by means of
using an Internet search engine. (R. at 4-5.)
Even though HackLibrary may lack a set policy for determining
which hacked sites to post, it apparently exercises choice over its
archive's content because it is likely to exclude minor sites. (R. at 4.)
Additionally, even though several similar "hacked page" sites exist on
the web, it was only HackLibrary that posted ChiPost.com's hacked page
on its archive. (R. at 5.)
While Wolfs personal information was available for public viewing
on HackLibrary's archive, Wolf himself was subjected to an onslaught of
harassing e-mail and telephone messages in the privacy of his home. (R.
at 5.) Indeed, many of the offensive calls were placed at all hours of the
night. (R. at 5.) Much like the "comments" exclusively found on HackLibrary's archive, these aggravating messages ridiculed Wolfs handling
of his family and financial affairs. (R. at 5.)
In April of 1999, Wolf discovered that ChiPost.com's hacked page
had been available on HackLibrary's archive for more that two months.
(R. at 5.) Wolf immediately contacted HackLibrary and requested it to
remove the hacked ChiPost.com page from its archive, or to alternatively
redact the references to him from the "comments." (R. at 5-6.)
HackLibrary refused to honor Wolf s request, retorting that it was
merely saving copies of sites that had already been on public display on
the web. (R. at 6.) Upon denial of his request, Wolf brought suit against
HackLibrary for invasion of his privacy, seeking damages for the harm
he suffered as a result of HackLibrary's publicly disclosing his private
facts. (R. at 6.)

B.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This action was originally brought in the Madison County Circuit
Court in the State of Marshall. (R. at 2, 6.) HackLibrary moved for summary judgment arguing that: (1) It was immune from liability under 47
U.S.C. § 230(c) (Supp. 1997) of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA")
because it could not be treated as the publisher of hacked web sites created by other persons; and (2) the publication of Wolfs facts was not actionable because the information had already been public at the time of
disclosure, and was also the subject of legitimate public concern. (R. at
6.) The trial court found HackLibrary to be an "interactive computer service provider," and granted its motion for summary judgment, holding
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that HackLibrary was immune from liability under section 230(c). (R. at
6.)
The First District Court of Appeals for the State of Marshall affirmed the trial court's summary judgment award on different grounds.
(R. at 2.) Specifically, the court of appeals held that section 230(c) did
not immunize HackLibrary from liability because HackLibrary was a
"provider" rather than a "publisher" of the actionable content. (R. at 67.) However, the court of appeals found that the facts HackLibrary disclosed about Wolf had already been public at the time of disclosure. (R.
at 8.) Moreover, the court of appeals held that the First Amendment
protected the disclosure of Wolfs facts because ChiPost.com's hacking
was a newsworthy event of legitimate concern to the public. (R. at 9.)
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment in
HackLibrary's favor. (R. at 9.)
On July 27, 1999, this Court granted Wolf leave to appeal the decision of the court of appeals. (R. at 12.) The issues under consideration
are whether HackLibrary is protected from liability under section 230(c)
of the CDA, and whether its actions constitute an invasion of Wolfs privacy. (R. at 12.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.
The Marshall Court of Appeals for the First District correctly held that
HackLibrary is not shielded from liability as an "interactive computer
service" under section 230(c). HackLibrary is responsible for creating
the actionable material and is thus liable under section 230 as a "content
provider." HackLibrary is also subject to liability for refusing to withdraw the material after being informed of its actionable character. Finally, absolving HackLibrary, a commercial web site operator, from
liability for publicly disclosing Wolfs private facts is against public policy and contrary to congressional intent.
B.
The court of appeals erred when it held that HackLibrary is not liable
for invading Wolfs privacy. First, the CDA does not preempt Wolfs invasion of privacy claim brought under Marshall state law. Second,
HackLibrary's disclosure of Wolf's private facts constituted an invasion
of Wolfs privacy under the Second Restatement of Torts, which is followed in Marshall. Finally, Wolfs private facts were neither newsworthy nor had they already been made public when HackLibrary
disclosed them. Therefore, Wolf is entitled to relief under Marshall law,
and the judgment of the court of appeals should be accordingly reversed.
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I.

SECTION 230(c) OF THE CDA DOES NOT IMMUNIZE
HACKLIBRARY FROM LIABILITY FOR INVADING
WOLF'S PRIVACY UNDER MARSHALL LAW.

The government has a duty to protect the right of its citizens to avoid
intrusions of their privacy. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85
(1988). While common decency defines what constitutes a privacy intrusion, the primary concerns are the feelings of the individual and the
harm the individual will suffer by the exposure of his private matters to
the public. See Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 200 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670
(Ct. App. 1984).
In this case, HackLibrary egregiously invaded Harry Wolf's privacy
when it publicized intimate facts relating to the state of his marriage,
financial history, and his own identity. This morbid prying into Wolf's
private life was further exacerbated by the fact the disclosure occurred
on the Internet, where a communication rapidly reaches a wide audience. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D.
Mo. 1996). Consequently, this Court should offer Wolf the protection
enunciated in Frisby, and hold HackLibrary liable for the harm it caused
him.
A.

SECTION 230(c) DOES NOT IMMUNIZE HACKLIBRARY FROM LIABILITY
BECAUSE IT Is NEITHER A "PUBLISHER" NOR A "SPEAKER" OF THE
ACTIONABLE MATERIAL IT POSTED ON ITS ARCHIVE.

The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(1) (Supp. 1997); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849
(1997) ("Reno I"). Internet communications are generally accomplished
between "servers" and "clients." See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 926
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). A "server" is a computer system that accesses stored
data and presents it over the Internet to a client. See id. "Client" refers
to software that displays or presents the data received from the "server."
See id.
The primary form of client-server communication today is the World
Wide Web ("web"). See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 483 (E.D. Pa.
1999) ("Reno II"). The web consists of billions of "hypertext" documents
maintained on servers. See id. "Many organizations have 'home pages'
on the Web." Id. "These are documents that provide a set of links
designed to represent the organization, and through links from the home
page, guide the user directly or indirectly to information about or relevant to their organization." Id.
Viewers can access specific web pages by using "search engines,"
programs making use of software capable of automatically contacting
various web pages and enabling users to quickly locate information they
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are specifically seeking. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Finally, a "hacker" is an "individual involved with the
unauthorized access of computer systems by various means." United
States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
1. HackLibrary is subject to liability as an information "content
provider" under section 230(c) because it created the content that gave
rise to this action.
"No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (Supp. 1997). "The term
'interactive computer service' means any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or
system that provides access to the Internet.... ." Id. § 230(f)(2). Under
this definition, HackLibrary is a "user" of an "interactive computer service" because there is no evidence that HackLibrary offers a connection
to the Internet as a whole.
"The term 'information content provider' means any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service." Id. § 230(f)(3). Accordingly, Section 230(c) does not extend immunity from liability to parties who make on-line postings of
actionable material they have created themselves. See Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); 141 Cong. Rec. S8345
(daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
The case of Blumenthal v. Drudge is particularly instructive. 992 F.
Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998). In Blumenthal, a presidential advisor brought a
defamation suit against gossip columnist Drudge and interactive service
provider America Online ("AOL") over a statement Drudge published on
the Internet alleging plaintiff had a spousal abuse past. See id. at 46.
However, Drudge had a licensing agreement with AOL under whose
terms Drudge would "create" the report and provide AOL with copies in
exchange for a royalty. See id. Drudge transmitted the actionable report
both to his own web site and to AOL via e-mail. See id. at 48.
The court granted AOL's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds AOL could not be held liable as a publisher or distributor of the
actionable material under section 230(c). See id. at 51-53. However,
Blumenthal's narrow holding has no bearing in this case because Blumenthal sued under a defamation rather than "public disclosure of private facts" theory. This is a crucial difference because "[tihe terms
'publisher' and 'distributor' derive their legal significance from the con-
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text of defamation law," Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332, and are thus meaningful
only in a defamation context.
Moreover, the publisher-distributor distinction is irrelevant to a
public disclosure of private facts case because once a plaintiffs private
information becomes public, republication by third parties-in contrast
to republication in a defamation case-is not actionable. See Veilleux v.
National Broad. Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 23, 37 (D. Maine 1998). Consequently, the result in Blumenthal was predicated on defamation law
principles inapplicable to public disclosure cases, and should not be considered as persuasive precedent.
The nonapplicability of its result notwithstanding, Blumenthal is
significant because the court qualified its holding by adding that AOL
would have been liable under section 230(c) had it been even partly responsible for creating the actionable material. See Blumenthal, 992 F.
Supp. at 50 (emphasis added).
While the court gave deference to the legislative prerogative immunizing interactive service providers from liability over third-party defamatory content, it also proclaimed that "[ijf we were writing on a clean
slate, we would agree with the plaintiff." Id. This unequivocal statement underscores the grave concern courts have with a rigid rule invariably depriving an injured plaintiff like Wolf of meaningful recourse when
a service provider posts a third party's actionable material on-line.
Several federal courts have shared this concern. In Zeran v.
America Online, Inc., the court granted summary judgment in AOL's
favor where the plaintiff claimed he had been defamed by an unidentified
third party who posted messages on one of AOL's discussion forums. 958
F. Supp. 1124, 1137 (E.D. Va.), affd, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). Similar to Blumenthal, the court held AOL was not a publisher of the third
party's defamatory statements, and was thus immune from liability
under section 230(c)(1). See id. at 1133. However, the court agreed that
there could be cases where information initially placed on-line by a third
party would be deemed to be information created by the service provider
itself, thereby rendering section 230(c)(1) inoperable. See id. at n.20.
This is indeed such a case. The record indicates that HackLibrary
either downloaded ChiPost.com's hacked page or received a copy by email. (R. at 4.) In either case, but for HackLibrary's conscious decision
to copy and post the hacked page on the web, the actionable material
would have disappeared following ChiPost.com's restoration. This is because there is no evidence the hackers posted the page anywhere else on
the Internet, and the record shows that no other "hacked site" archive
posted the page either.
Section 230(c) does not define the term "create." "When a word is not
defined by a statute, [courts] normally construe it by reference to a dic-
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tionary." Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 898 (10th Cir.
1997). To "create" means to "cause to exist" or to "bring into being."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY

338 (2d ed. 1995). By making available

the sole copy of a page that was otherwise doomed to disappear, HackLibrary effectively caused the page, and all of its contents, to exist on the
Internet.
This fact underlies another crucial distinction from Blumenthal. In
Blumenthal, even if AOL had deleted its own copy of the Drudge Report,
that report would have still been available for perusal on the Internet
because Drudge posted it both on AOL's system and on his own web
page. See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 47-48. Therefore, AOL escaped
liability because Blumenthal could not show that AOL created the report's content. See id. at 50. In sharp contrast, HackLibrary has created
the hacked page and should be liable for its contents under section
230(c)(1) in this case. See id.
Moreover, the fact that HackLibrary chooses which hacked pages to
display on its archive demonstrates that it is creating content in a manner similar to that of a traditional news medium, by virtue of its being
"more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment and advertising." Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
Significantly, the fact that HackLibrary kept ChiPost.com's hacked web
page for three days before finally posting it on its archive raises the inference that HackLibrary debated the posting of the page, which in turn
shows HackLibrary's complete editorial control over its archive's content.
For these reasons, HackLibrary is a content provider under section
230(f) and, therefore, not immune from liability. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1) (Supp. 1997).
2. HackLibrary is subject to liability because it refused to remove
Wolf's information from its archive after Wolf notified it of the
information's actionable character.
In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's granting of
summary judgment in AOL's favor where a pseudonymous AOL user
posted defamatory messages about Zeran on AOL's message boards. 129
F.3d at 328. As a result of these messages, Zeran was inundated with
threatening and offensive telephone calls. See id.
On appeal, Zeran primarily argued that following notification, AOL
"unreasonably delayed in removing the defamatory messages posted" by
the third party. Id. Zeran further contended that AOL also "failed to
screen for similar postings thereafter." Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
holding that Zeran could not sustain a suit against AOL under section
230(c)(1) because AOL was neither the publisher nor the distributor of
the actionable material. See id. at 330-31. The court added that "it
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would be impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions
of postings for possible problems." Id. at 331.
However, this case is highly distinguishable from Zeran. First, in
marked contrast to AOL, HackLibrary did not simply delay in removing
Wolfs private information from its archive. Instead, it flatly refused to
remove the actionable material after Wolf put it on notice of the material's character. Because HackLibrary chose to post Wolfs private facts
on its archive while fully aware of their actionable content, it should be
held liable.
Second, unlike AOL, which has more than sixteen million subscribers constantly posting new material on-line, see America Online, Inc. v.
AT&T Corp., No. CIV.A. 98-1821-A, 1999 WL 688152, at *1 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 13, 1999), HackLibrary maintains a static archive of only about 200
web pages, the composition of which changes only at HackLibrary's will.
Additionally, the fact HackLibrary kept the hacked page for three days
before posting it on its archive further demonstrates that, contrary to
AOL in Zeran, HackLibrary had ample opportunity to investigate its
materials before it posted them on-line.
Finally, unlike defamation, truth is not a defense to a public disclosure claim. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Consequently, HackLibrary would not have been burdened with determining
the veracity of the content that became the basis of this lawsuit. Therefore, none of the reasons the Fourth Circuit articulated in favor of AOL
in Zeran apply to HackLibrary in this case.
In fact, some courts have been reluctant to extend interactive service
providers the same amount of immunity that the Fourth Circuit did in
Zeran. A case in point is Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., where the
plaintiff alleged he was defamed by a third-party article that appeared
on one of CompuServe's discussion fora. 776 F. Supp. 135, 136 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). Cubby is especially significant because the court expressly defined the applicable standard of liability for a service provider to be
"whether it knew or had reason to know" that the third-party material it
posted on-line was actionable. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140-41. Under
this standard, an interactive service provider that is put on notice of its
content's actionable character cannot escape liability simply because the
content was created by a third party. Accordingly, HackLibrary is subject to liability for publicly disclosing Wolfs private facts.
This standard is deep-rooted in the common law. See generally
Byrne v. Deane, 1 K.B. 818, 821 (Eng. C.A. 1937) (holding property
owner's inaction in removing writing from his wall after receiving notice
of writing's actionable nature constitutes publication of the writing).
Following this longstanding approach, the British Defamation Act of
1996 does not provide a defense for service providers knowingly dissemi-
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nating actionable material on the Internet. See Defamation Act, 1996,
ch. 31, § 1 (Eng.). 1
In the United States, some information service providers and users
have sought to avoid liability for third-party content by claiming common
carrier status, as common carriers are generally immune from liability
for the content of messages they carry on their equipment. See Lunney v.
Prodigy Serv. Co., 683 N.Y.S.2d 557, 562 (App. Div. 1998).
Congress has not provided clarification as to whether an information
service provider or user is a common carrier. However, "where a statute
is silent with respect to a specific issue, the Court must defer to the
[overseeing] agency's interpretation of the statute...." Chevron, U.SA.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984). Pertinently, in a 1998 report to Congress, the FCC found that
information service providers are not subject to regulation as common
carriers. See In the Matter of Federal-StateJoint Board on Universal
Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501 § 13 (1998). Thus, HackLibrary is not a common carrier merely because it posts material on the Internet. See also
America Online, Inc. v. Greatdeals.net,49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 856 (E.D. Va.
1999) (holding that AOL is not a common carrier merely because of its
being an information service provider).
Moreover, "lack of control over content does not by itself make one a
common carrier," World Communications v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1471
(D.C. Cir. 1984), and merely "earning a profit does not make one a common carrier" either. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC,572 F.2d 17, 26-27
(2d Cir. 1978). Under these holdings, HackLibrary cannot claim that it
is a common carrier simply because it refrained from altering the hacked
page's content or because it derives its revenue from advertising. Accordingly, HackLibrary cannot be entitled to immunity from liability by
claiming common carrier status.
B.

ABSOLVING HACKLIBRARY FROM LIABILITY

Is

AGAINST PUBLIC

POLICY AND VIOLATES CONGRESS' INTENT.

Section 230 of the CDA is not affected by the finding that the "indecent
transmission" and "patently offensive" provisions of the Act are unconstitutional. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) ("Reno I"). This is
because "the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502
(1985). Consequently, section 230's expressed purpose to deter stalking
and harassment by means of a computer remains a valid objective of the
CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (Supp. 1997).
1. (See Appendix C.)
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1. It is againstpublic policy to immunize HackLibrary, a for-profit
web site operator,from liability for publicly disclosing Wolfs private

facts.
There are four reasons why HackLibrary must be held liable for disclosing Wolfs private facts. First, the CDA was partly enacted in order
to protect citizens from electronic harassment as well as to protect the
sanctuary of the home from uninvited indecencies. See 141 CONG. REC.
S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
In this case, Wolf clearly requested HackLibrary to refrain from displaying his personal information on its archive, especially since it appeared to cause the series of harassing telephone calls that intruded
upon Wolfs privacy at his home. See State by Humphrey v. CasinoMktg.
Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 888 (Minn. 1992). HackLibrary disregarded
Wolf s legitimate request and then violated the express congressional
policy of protecting an individual's privacy interest, by disclosing Wolfs
private facts. HackLibrary's actions were all the more flagrant because
most of the resulting harassment took place in Wolfs own home. See
City of Watseka v. Illinois Pub. Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1578 (7th
Cir. 1986). HackLibrary must not be allowed to rely on section 230 of the
CDA to shield itself from liability that arises from violating that same
statute's underlying purpose.
Another important purpose of section 230 was to encourage service
providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over
their services. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (Supp. 1997); Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). However, Zeran's offering
of blanket immunity to internet service providers for any third-party
content they post would eliminate content monitoring costs while simultaneously minimizing the service providers' risk of liability. As a result,
service providers would be bereft of any motive to engage in selfregulation.
On the other hand, the Zeran and Blumenthal decisions demonstrate the power of interactive service providers to inflict severe damage
on the private lives of those who, like Wolf, have a limited ability to defend themselves. In this case, HackLibrary had exclusive power to remove the actionable material from its archive but refused to do so.
Furthermore, because Wolf did not know the identity of the hackers, he
could not sue them for damages. Thus, if Wolfs suit against HackLibrary is precluded as a matter of law, Wolf would be left without a
remedy. This refutes the Fourth Circuit's argument that notice-based
liability must be rejected on the grounds of fostering frivolous lawsuits
against service providers. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
Moreover, HackLibrary is engaged in the business of posting hacked
pages on the Internet because it derives revenue from advertisements it
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carries on its archive. See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A) (Supp. 1999).2 Because HackLibrary's business involved the posting of Wolfs private information, it is only fair for HackLibrary to bear the cost that is
commensurate with the benefit it derived, and compensate Wolf for the
damage it caused him. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51
(D.D.C. 1998).
Additionally, the application of the Zeran rule to similar cases would
lead to absurd judicial results. For example, a newspaper disclosing private facts about an individual in its print version is subject to liability.
See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 1975). However,
under Zeran, the same newspaper would be immune from liability for
printing the same facts on its on-line version, where the audience can be
larger, and the resulting harm to plaintiff greater. See Zeran, 129 F.3d
at 331.
The Fourth Circuit has also warned that notice-based liability would
cause a chilling effect on Internet speech because service providers would
"have an incentive to remove contents upon notification" in order to avoid
potential liability. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (citing PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986)). The court further declared
that this chilling effect on Internet speech would be incompatible with
First Amendment mandates. See id. However, the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the First Amendment is misplaced.
The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech. See U.S. Const. amend. I; 3 DenverArea
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996).
However, freedom of speech is not an absolute right. See Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). Although core First
Amendment principles make the safeguarding of this freedom a
steadfast rule, "differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them." Red Lion
Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (holding that each medium of expression must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by
its own standard). Under the First Amendment, both the content and
context of speech are critical elements. See FCC v. PacificaFound., 438
U.S. 726, 744 (1978).
In this context, the government may limit protected speech where a
communication continues to invade a substantial privacy interest after
2. "A person will be deemed to be 'engaged in the business' if the person ... devotes
time, attention, or labor in such activities ... with the objective of earning a profit." 47
U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A) (Supp. 1999).
3. The United States Constitution applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
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the sender receives clear and unambiguous notice of the specific communication that the complainant does not want to receive. See Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970). In this case,
Wolf informed HackLibrary that the hacked ChiPost.com page contained
items of his private information. (R. at 5-6.) Because HackLibrary refused to remove Wolfs information, his privacy interests continued to be
invaded for so long as his information remained posted on HackLibrary's
archive. Accordingly, imposing liability on HackLibrary does not interfere with its First Amendment rights. See id.
Finally, neither the statute nor its legislative history support the
proposition that Congress intended to protect free speech by enacting
section 230(c)(1). Thus, while eliminating notice-based liability might be
consistent with the goal of promoting unfettered free speech on-line, it is
inconsistent with fostering self-regulation, which is after all the enunciated congressional objective. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3) (Supp. 1997).
Therefore, this Court should espouse Congress' policy considerations and
subject HackLibrary to liability for the posting of Wolfs private information on its archive.
2. Congress did not intend to shield interactive service providers or
users from liability for actionable material they post on the web merely
because someone else was the original author.
In construing a statute, courts must start with its language. See Bailey
v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144 (1995). However, courts should also
be cognizant of the statute's legislative history, especially when the scope
of the statute is ambiguous. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 522 (1982). The CDA contains provisions that were either added after the hearings were concluded or as amendments offered during
floor debate on the legislation. See S. REP. No. 105-225, at 8-9 (1998).
Consequently, doubts remain as to the statute's meaning and scope.
These doubts should therefore be resolved by examining the statute's
legislative history. See Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S.
122, 123 (1983).
When examining a statute's legislative history for an indication of
congressional intent, a congressional committee conference report is recognized as the most reliable evidence of congressional intent because it
represents the final statement of the terms agreed to by both houses. See
Garciav. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984). Congress enacted section
230(c) in order to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Serv., Inc., No.
31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995), and any similar
decisions which treat on-line "providers and users as publishers and
speakers of content that is not their own because they have restrictedaccess to objectionable material." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 208 (emphasis added).
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At the outset, Congress' policy behind the protection is antithetical
to HackLibrary's conduct. This is because not only has HackLibrary patently failed to restrict access to objectionable material (as evidenced by
the pornographic images displayed on the hacked version of ChiPost.com's page), but it has continued to offer such access after being
notified of the material's objectionable character.
Additionally, because Congress only intended to overrule Stratton
Oakmont and other similar decisions which have treated interactive service providers as publishers of content created by others, see H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), the courts should read the statute narrowly and apply it only in the context of defamation claims.
Significantly, there is no reference in the legislative history to
Cubby. See id. Moreover, Congress is presumed to act intentionally
when omitting a word in a statute. See United States v. Wong Kim Bo,
472 F.2d 720, 727 (5th Cir. 1972). Thus, had Congress intended to exempt on-line providers from notice-based liability, as well as republisher
liability, it would not have limited its discussion to Stratton Oakmont.
See Ian C. Ballon, Zeran v. AOL: Why the Fourth CircuitIs Wrong (visited Aug. 12, 1999) <http://www.finnegan.com/pubs/internet/
zeranvaol.html>.
Furthermore, Stratton Oakmont, did not impose notice-based liability on the defendant. Consequently, Congress did not have to obviate
notice-based liability in order to overrule the case. Indeed, by reversing
Stratton Oakmont, section 230 codified a modified version of the Cubby
standard under which a service provider or user may be held liable for
third-party statements in instances where it actually knew the material
posted on-line was actionable, and failed to take any action. See Ian C.

Ballon, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 19TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
COMPUTER LAw 1997, at 169, 279 (PLI PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEAND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 547,
1999).
Finally, the "publisher" and "notice-based" terminology have been
extensively used in cases and commentary on the subject of defamation
in interactive networks. Because Congress has used the common-law
term "publisher" in the CDA, Congress is presumed to have intended the
statutory definition of the term to encompass the same meaning as its
common-law counterpart. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp.,
485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (holding that in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress was presumed to be familiar with and accept the common-law definition of the term "restraint of trade" with all its evolutionary
possibilities).
For these reasons, it is evident that had Congress intended to extend
protection from notice-based liability to interactive service providers, it
MARKS,
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would have expressly done so. Because no such express mandate exists,
Wolfs claim against HackLibrary for public disclosure of private facts
has been validly asserted.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY HELD THAT
HACKLIBRARY DID NOT INVADE WOLF'S PRIVACY
UNDER MARSHALL LAW.

The danger that new technologies pose upon the "dignity and personality of the individual" has been a paramount concern for jurists and commentators ever since Warren and Brandeis published their seminal
article on privacy. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). The right to privacy not only
protects an individual's seclusion, solitude or private affairs, but also forbids the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. See William
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 401 (1960). Recent commentary
has naturally concentrated on how Internet communications can invade
an individual's right to privacy via disclosure of private facts. See Giorgio Bovenzi, Liabilitiesof System Operatorson the Internet, 11 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 117 (1996). Indeed, the effect of increased computer use
on individual privacy has been the matter of recent supranational legis4
lation. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 27, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31.
A.

HACKLIBRARY INVADED WOLF'S PRIVACY UNDER MARSHALL LAW

BECAUSE IT PUBLICLY DISCLOSED WOLF'S PRIVATE FACTS.

The State of Marshall follows the Second Restatement of Torts in invasion of privacy cases. (R. at 8.) However, a potential choice of law problem arises because Wolf is an Illinois resident, who has also suffered the
harm in Illinois. (R. at 10.) 5 This problem is overcome, however, because, like Marshall, Illinois courts follow the Restatement approach in
deciding public disclosure cases. See Miller v. Motorola,Inc., 560 N.E.2d
900, 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Therefore, the same substantive law is
eventually applied regardless of the answer to the choice of law problem.
As regards procedural law, summary judgment is appropriate where
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
4. See Appendix C.
5. Because suit was filed in Marshall, this state's choice of law rules determine the
applicable substantive law. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
In this context, some courts have held that privacy claims should be determined by the law
of the jurisdiction where plaintiff is domiciled, which would be Illinois in this case. See
Bernstein v. National Broad. Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 825-26 (D.D.C.), affd, 232 F.2d 369
(D.C. Cir. 1956). Other courts follow the "most significant relationship" approach, which
would lead to the application of Marshall law. See Davis v. Costa-Gavras, 580 F. Supp.
1082, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). On review, the evidence is construed in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 233 (1991). Finally, this Court should exercise de novo review over First Amendment
issues. See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496
U.S. 91, 108 (1990).
1.

The CDA does not preempt Wolfs action againstHackLibrary
brought under Marshall State law.

The Supreme Court has held that federal preemption of state law is
appropriate in three circumstances: (i) where Congress expresses an intent to displace state law; (ii) where Congress implies such an intent;
and (iii) where state law conflicts with federal law. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
The federal statute applicable to this case states in pertinent part:
"[Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any State law that is consistent with that section." 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(3) (Supp. 1997). Thus, section 230 reflects no express congressional intent to preempt all state law causes of action arising out of privacy torts committed by service providers or users. See Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Virginia Gasoline Marketers, 34 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 1994).
As to implied intent, the question to be asked is whether Congress,
in enacting the federal statute, intended to exercise its constitutionally
delegated authority to set aside the laws of a state. See Barnett Bank of
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 30 (1996). However, "statutes which invade the common law are to be read with a presumption
favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, except
when the statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." United States v.
Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 533 (1993); see also Louisiana v. Maryland, 451 U.S.
725, 746 (1981) (presumption is that Congress does not attempt to displace state law).
Section 230 further provides: "No cause of action may be brought
and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (Supp. 1997). The
statute does not define "inconsistent" state causes of action. However,
the legislative history shows that by overruling Stratton Oakmont Congress intended to preempt state law only in the area of defamation. See
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), 1996 WL 46795. Because
there is no evidence that Congress intended to preempt public disclosure
of private facts claims, Wolf's suit against HackLibrary is not implicitly
preempted by section 230 of the CDA. See United States v. Texas, 507
U.S. 529, 533 (1993).
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Moreover, the fact that several states have enacted legislation aimed
at regulating the conduct of interactive services users underscores the
absence of a blanket federal preemption in cases of torts committed online. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-9.1 (1996) (prohibiting Internet users
from falsely identifying themselves on-line); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 17502 (West 1997) (providing for penalties in cases of on-line false
advertising).
Additionally, "the Supremacy Clause6 commands preemption of
state laws to the extent that such laws directly conflict with federal law."
Zeran v. America Online, 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1131 (E.D. Va.), affd, 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit elaborated that direct conflicts requiring preemption exist: (1) where it is impossible for a private
party to comply with both federal and state law; and (2) where state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. See id. at 1133-35.
First, the test for determining whether simultaneous compliance
with both federal and state law is possible consists of deciding whether
both federal and state law may concurrently operate without impairing
the operation of the former. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit,
362 U.S. 440, 447-48 (1960). In this case, Wolf's assertion of a public
disclosure claim under Marshall law does not impair the operation of section 230(c). This is because Wolf does not claim that HackLibrary is liable as a "publisher" (which section 230 proscribes), but rather as a
content provider, which section 230 allows. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)
(Supp. 1997). Therefore, Wolfs claim cannot be preempted on the
grounds it renders section 230 inoperative. See FloridaLime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (applying state law
does not offend the Supremacy Clause where party can simultaneously
comply with federal law).
Second, Congress' objective in enacting section 230 was to promote
self-regulation of Internet service providers by refusing to impose "publisher" liability on providers who made efforts to restrict access to objectionable material. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 208 (1996), 1996
WL 46795. In sharp contrast, HackLibrary has not made any effort to
restrict objectionable material in this case, as is evidenced by its refusal
to redact Wolfs private information, and by its display of pornography on
its archive. Therefore, Wolfs assertion of his public disclosure claim
does not impede the fulfillment of congressional objectives. Accordingly,
Wolf's claim is not preempted by section 230. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (federal preemption proper in area of foreign policy where federal government has exclusive legislative authority).
6. U.S. CONST. art. V1, c. 2; see Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,
368 (1986).
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Finally, the Fourth Circuit in Zeran based its finding of preemption
on the Commerce Clause, which empowers Congress to act in a field of
"apparent international character" such as the Internet. 7 See Zeran v.
America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997). Even if service
provider regulation is a part of interstate commerce, the Fourth Circuit's
reliance on the Commerce Clause is misplaced because state laws regulating commerce must be preempted only "when Congress has unmistakably ordained that its enactments alone are to regulate [that] part of
commerce . . . ." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
Because it has been shown that section 230 does not preempt state law
expressly or otherwise, any attempt to predicate federal preemption on
Commerce Clause grounds must fail.
2.

HackLibrary, Inc. publicly disclosed Harry Wolf's private facts.

The State of Marshall recognizes the tort of public disclosure of private
facts:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy if the
matter publicized is of a kind that:
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
Publicity
Publicity means that the matter is publicized by communicating it to
the general public, or to a sufficient number of people that it becomes
public knowledge. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir.
1975). In order to sustain a public disclosure of private facts action, the
plaintiff need only present evidence of an actual disclosure to the general
public or one which is likely to reach the general public, as opposed to a
"publication" required in a defamation action. See Tureen v. Equifax,
571 F.2d 411, 419 (8th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). "The likelihood of
widespread dissemination can be inferred from the medium employed by
the defendant for the particular publication." Williams v. IKMCO Broad.
Div.-Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). Traditionally,
any publication of plaintiffs private facts in a newspaper or magazine of
even a small circulation has been sufficient to give publicity to the facts.
See Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Wis. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

222

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVIII

In this case, the record does not reflect how many viewers visited
HackLibrary's archive between January and April of 1999. Yet, display
of Wolfs information on a site of even moderate traffic would suffice to
render it public despite the fact that the "comments" were not viewable
by most web browsers. This is because the information was available to
anyone on the Internet for more than two months. "Approximately 70.2
million people of all ages use the Internet in the United States alone."
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481-82 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("Reno IF).
Given the sheer number of on-line users, it is almost certain that some of
HackLibrary's visitors were able to read the "comments." At a minimum, there exists an issue of fact as to whether the information's disclosure amounted to publicity. Therefore, summary judgment for
HackLibrary was improper and must be reversed. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Private Facts
The second element of a public disclosure claim is that the disclosed
facts are private. See Roshto v. Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. 1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Private facts typically
encompass family, sexual, medical, financial, or other intensely personal
topics. See Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977).
Most importantly, the right to privacy extends to the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters about the marital relationship. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). The disclosure of
the fact that Danielle Wolf was "pursuing" a divorce falls squarely within
this rule's ambit. Pursuing a divorce manifests a strenuous marital relationship that a reasonable couple would not want revealed to the public,
especially where the difficulty has been the result of a spouse's abandonment and extramarital affair. Cf Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 734
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding that facts of an amorous relationship belong to
the private realm).
Moreover, the bankruptcy history of an individual is not a matter of
public concern to third parties not legitimately interested in that individual's financial situation. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456
S.W.2d 896, 898-99 (Tex. 1970). Third parties are not entitled to this
information absent their having a legitimate business reason, such as
commencing a transaction with the individual. See id. Similarly, Wolfs
bankruptcy information is of no interest to HackLibrary's readers because none of them had a legitimate business interest in Wolf s financial
history or creditworthiness.
Finally, an individual's identity is treated as a private fact where its
disclosure is irrelevant to the issue incident to disclosure. See Doe v.
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Univision Television Group, 717 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(TV interviewee's identity was irrelevant to the medical problems his
neighbors faced, and was not thus a topic of public concern). Similarly,
Wolf's address, date of birth and social security number constitute private facts because their disclosure was the byproduct of an irrelevant
hacking of a major newspaper's web page. In any event, granting HackLibrary's motion for summary judgment was improper because all these
questions should have been decided by a jury. See Winstead v. Sweeney,
517 N.W.2d 664, 673 (Mich. 1994).
Offensive Material
When intimate details of one's life are displayed in public in a manner offensive to the ordinary reasonable person, there is an actionable
invasion of privacy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b
(1977). "An individual ... is most offended by the publication of intimate
personal facts when the community has no interest in them beyond the
voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that surrounds a
stranger." Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir.
1993).
In this regard, the case of Michaels v. Internet EntertainmentGroup,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998), is particularly illuminating.
Michaels, a popular musician, moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent dissemination of a videotape on the grounds of invasion of privacy
and copyright infringement. See id. at 828. The tape depicted the plaintiff and a famous actress, the intervenor, having sex. See id.
The court found that "distribution of the tape on the Internet would
constitute public disclosure of the plaintiffs private facts despite the fact
that another videotape depicting the intervenor having sex with her husband had already been widely distributed." Id. at 840. The court explained that "even people who voluntarily enter the public sphere retain
a privacy interest in the most intimate details of their lives," and concluded that the videotape's contents were highly offensive to the plaintiff.
Id.
In this case, the information about Wolf's marital difficulties and infidelity is also offensive because intimate relations and family quarrels
are entirely private matters to which no reasonable member of the community has an interest. See Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 341
(Wash. 1998). Hence, the "comments" HackLibrary posted on its archive
constitute private matters, the disclosure of which was highly offensive
to Wolf.
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Is

NOT ENTITLED To ANY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
ABSOLVING IT FROM LIABILITY.

There is no liability when a defendant merely gives further publicity to
information about the plaintiff that is already public. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (1977). Additionally, there is no liability when the facts disclosed are newsworthy because they are of legiti-

mate interest to the public. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 652D (1977).
1.

Wolf's private information had not been publicly displayed before
HackLibraryposted it on its archive.

"An individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that
information may already be available to the public in some form."
United States Dep't of Defense v. FederalLaborRelations Auth., 510 U.S.
487, 500 (1994); Abraham & Rose, PLC v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075,
1083 (6th Cir. 1998).
The Michaels court also applies this holding. 5 F. Supp. 2d at 823.
The court found that ten days prior to the public disclosure that gave rise
to the suit, a 148-second clip from the actionable videotape became available for viewing on the Internet. See id. at 841. The court rejected defendant's argument that this amounted to a previous disclosure, holding
instead that the exposure of a portion of the tape for ten days could not
render the contents of the clip "matters of public knowledge." Id. Therefore, the plaintiffs privacy interest in the unreleased portion of the tape
was found to be undiminished. See id.
This case is strikingly similar to Michaels in this respect. However,
the court of appeals found that because the actionable information remained on ChiPost.com's hacked page for three hours before being removed, Wolfs information had become public before HackLibrary posted
the page on its archive. This holding is baseless because the record is
devoid of any access statistics for ChiPost.com's site during the three
hours the hacked page was on display. Whether the number of viewers
was sufficient to constitute a "public disclosure" can therefore only be
speculated. Consequently, the granting of HackLibrary's summary judgment motion was improper because all doubt must be construed in the
nonmovant's favor. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 233 (1991).
Furthermore, if a video clip can remain on the Internet for ten days
without rendering the contents of the entire videotape public, it follows
that neither can the display of a web page for three hours constitute a
public disclosure. See Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
Additionally, the fact that an event is not wholly private does not
mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemi-
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nation of the information. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 770 (1989). It is certain that the number of people
who viewed Wolfs private information within this three-hour period is
substantially smaller than the total number who visited the page during
that time because Wolfs information was encoded as "comments" and
was, therefore, not viewable by the majority of Internet browsers. (R. at
3.) However, even if a small number of people viewed Wolfs information
before HackLibrary posted it on its archive, Wolfs privacy interest is not
diminished in the least, and he can validly assert his public disclosure
claim against HackLibrary. See id.
2.

HackLibrary could not be absolved from liability on the grounds
Wolf's private facts were newsworthy.
"When the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public con-

cern, there is no invasion of privacy."

RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS

§ 652D cmt. d (1977). The scope of legitimate public concern encompasses newsworthy matters. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955
P.2d 469, 478-79 (Cal. 1998); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 652D
cmt. g (1977). Additionally, the legitimate interest of the public may also

extend to the private matters of a public figure. See
OND) OF

RESTATEMENT (SEC-

TORTS § 652D cmt. f (1977).

Newsworthiness
Newsworthiness is determined by (a) the social value of the facts
disclosed, (b) the depth of the intrusion into the private affairs of the
plaintiff, and (c) the extent to which the plaintiff voluntarily acceded to a
position of public notoriety- See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc.,
483 P.2d 34, 45 (Cal. 1971); Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal.
1969).
A disclosure lacks social value when it fails to add to the knowledge
the citizens use when they make vital choices in the community. See
CentralNat'l Bank v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 900
(5th Cir. 1980). Knowledge of Wolfs marital difficulties, social security
number and bankruptcy history in no way enables a citizen to make a
significant choice relevant to community affairs. Moreover, the fact that
Wolfs private information remained encoded in "comments" even after
HackLibrary obtained a copy of the hacked page reflects that HackLibrary itself did not consider Wolfs information as possessing sufficient
social value to divulge to a wider audience. Also, the fact that the other
"hacked page" archives spurned ChiPost.com's hacked page indicates
that Wolfs private facts were not newsworthy.
Furthermore, a lapse of time is an important factor in determining
whether the publicity goes to unreasonable lengths in revealing facts
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about one who has resumed a private life. See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91,
94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (holding defendant liable for disclosing the fact
that plaintiff had been a prostitute and an acquitted defendant in a murder trial several years earlier); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D
cmt. k (1977).
Similarly, the public disclosure of Wolf's bankruptcy is deeply intrusive, especially where there is no evidence that Wolf has been financially
irresponsible during the past seventeen years. Moreover, Melvin demonstrates that even if Wolfs bankruptcy is part of the public record, it is
not necessarily newsworthy. This is because the plaintiff in Melvin prevailed despite the fact that her prosecution and trial for murder was part
of the public record. See id. at 93.
Finally, the court of appeals held that the information was newsworthy because it concerned the hacking of a major newspaper's web
page. (R. at 9.) However, even when an event is a matter of public interest, the identity of the person suffering the harm is not. See Vassiliades
v. Garfinckel's Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. 1985). Further, the
subject matter of the publicity here consists of Wolfs spousal relationship, bankruptcy history, and identification information, not ChiPost.com's hacking. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 652D
(1977). Therefore, the question of whether ChiPost.com's hacking constitutes newsworthy information is irrelevant to this dispute. See Virgil v.
Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975).
First Amendment Protection
The court of appeals further held that because HackLibrary's publication concerned a newsworthy matter, it was protected by the First
Amendment, especially since the matter asserted was true. However,
the Restatement provides for tort liability even when publicity is given to
true statements of fact. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7
(1967) (citing Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Critics of the Restatement approach have argued that imposing tort liability for publicly disclosing true facts about a plaintiff could violate the press' right to free
speech. To that end, these critics have relied on Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
where the court narrowly held that there can be no recovery for disclosure of and publicity to facts that are a matter of public record under the
First Amendment. 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (emphasis added).
However, the fact that Danielle Wolf was "pursuing a divorce" is not
a matter of public record because the record does not reflect that there
has been a filing for a divorce in court. See Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154
A.2d 422, 427 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1959). Similarly, because the record contains
no evidence that Wolfs bankruptcy proceedings were made public, there
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exists the possibility that the record was sealed or otherwise kept out of
the public record.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged that each individual is surrounded by a "zone of privacy within which the state may
protect him from intrusion by the press." Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 487 (1975). Furthermore, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
the Court recognized the strength of legitimate state interests in protecting the well-being of its citizens, even in the face of a broad First Amendment challenge. 403 U.S. 29, 64-65 (1971). Consequently, the court of
appeals' First Amendment analysis does not apply to this case.
Instead, protection from disclosure should apply to Wolfs other disclosed facts, namely his home and e-mail addresses, and social security
number. Specifically, a "strong privacy interest" exists with respect to
disclosure of one's social security number. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Ass'n Local 19 v. United States Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 135 F.3d 891,
898 (3d Cir. 1998). This is because a social security number is a universal identifier containing highly sensitive information about its bearer.
See George B. Trubow, Protecting InformationalPrivacy in the Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 521, 524 (1990).
On the other hand, the scope of a matter of public concern may extend to the use of names and likenesses in giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. j (1977). However, such
an extension of scope is valid only when the public is reasonably expected
to have a legitimate interest in what is disclosed. See id.
HackLibrary has indeed stated that many Internet users viewing
the hacked pages on its site do so "out of curiosity or academic interest."
(R. at 5.) Nevertheless, HackLibrary's contention is unavailing because
it has been shown that the public has no legitimate interest in knowing
Wolfs alleged spousal infidelities, bankruptcy history, and his other indicia of identification.
Ultimately, the court of appeals further erred by deciding the newsworthiness issue as a matter of law. This is because where is room for
differing views on whether a publication could be newsworthy, the question is one to be determined by the jury and not by the court. See TimesMirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 562 (Ct. App. 1988).
Public Figure
"A voluntary public figure is an individual voluntarily placing himself in the public eye." Restatement (Second) of Torts ? 652D cmt. e
(1977). Such public figures may be subject to disclosure of their private
facts. See Wilson v. Grant, 687 A.2d 1009, 1015 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

228

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVIII

Div. 1996). However, the record does not reflect that Wolf did anything
to accede to a position of public notoriety.
Moreover, even if Wolf is deemed an involuntary public figure by virtue of his assuming a prominent role in a cultural institution such as a
music publisher, it does not follow that it is in the public interest to know
private facts about him. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131
(9th Cir. 1975). Most persons are connected with some vocational activity as to which the public can be said to have a legitimate interest or
curiosity. To hold as a matter of law that private facts as to such persons
are also within the area of legitimate public interest would effectively
expose everyone's private life to public view. See Gilbert v. Medical
Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981).
Additionally, a matter is not deemed to be of public concern if it only
relates to the individual concerns of the discloser and its audience. See
Dun & Bradstreet,Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756
(1985). In this case, the hackers admitted to disclosing Wolfs information in retaliation for his professional dealings with a group of musicians.
(R. at 11.) Hence, the disclosure relates only to the interests of the hackers and their audience, which overlaps with HackLibrary's clientele.
Therefore, the publication of this information is not one of public
concern.
Finally, the standard for determining the scope of the public's legitimate interest in a disclosure about a public figure becomes a matter of
community mores. See Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n of N. Am.,
787 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1986). Because a question involving determination of community mores is one of fact, see Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 305 (Iowa 1979), the scope of the
public's legitimate interest in Wolf's facts must be determined by the
jury.
For these reasons, Wolfs personal information is not newsworthy,
and HackLibrary is not entitled to a newsworthiness defense absolving it
from liability. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in affirming summary judgment in HackLibrary's favor.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Harry Apostolakopoulos
Hunter M. Barrow
Kristi Belt
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APPENDIX A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
The Congress shall have Power...
[3] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
U.S. CONST. art. VI,

cl. 2

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST.

amend. I

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST.

amend. XlV

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
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number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil
or military, under the United States, or under any State, who having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the
United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and
bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not
be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume
or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of
any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
APPENDIX B
47 U.S.C. § 230 (Supp. 1997)
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive
material
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational
resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control
in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for
cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government
regulation.
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(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other
interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize
user control over what information is received by individuals, families,
and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer
services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their
children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter
and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means
of computer.
(c) Protection for "good samaritan" blocking and screening
of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material
described in paragraph (1).
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with a customer for the provision of interactive computer service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider,
notify such customer that parental control protections (such as computer
hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that
may assist the customer in limiting access to material that is harmful to
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minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with access
to information identifying, current providers
of such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement
of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.
(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.
(4) No effect on Communications Privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law.
(f) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term "Internet" means the international computer network of
both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data
networks.
(2) Interactive computer service
The term "interactive computer service" means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.
(3) Information content provider
The term "information content provider" means any person or entity
that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.
(4) Access software provider
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The term "access software provider" means a provider of software
(including client or server software), or enabling tools that do any one or
more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.
APPENDIX C
THE BRITISH DEFAMATION ACT

The British Defamation Act provides in pertinent part:
1 Responsibility for publication
(1) In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he shows
that-....
(c) he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did
caused or contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.
Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31, § 1 (Eng.)
APPENDIX D
THE EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE ON PRIVACY PROTECTION

The European Union Directive on Privacy Protection provides in pertinent part:
Article 1
s.1. In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect
the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.
Council Directive 95/46, art. 27, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HACKLIBRARY'S STATUTORY IMMUNITY DEFENSE BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS APPROPRIATE WHEN CONGRESS EXPRESSLY IMMUNIZED
INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICES FROM PUBLISHER LIABILITY FOR THE WORKS OF THIRD PARTIES.
II.

WHETHER SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S INVASION OF PRIVACY CLAIM IN FAVOR OF HACKLIBRARY WAS
APPROPRIATE WHEN HACKLIBRARY ARCHIVED INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THE PUBLIC DOMAIN THAT WAS OF
LEGITIMATE PUBLIC INTEREST.
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OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS BELOW
The order of the Madison County Circuit Court granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is unreported. The opinion of the
First District Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall affirming the Circuit Court's decision is contained in the Record on Appeal. (R. 1-12).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
A formal statement of jurisdiction is omitted pursuant to § 1020(2)
of the Rules for the Eighteenth Annual John Marshall Law School Moot
Court Competition in Information Technology and Privacy Law.
STATUTORY PROVISION
The excerpts from relevant statutory provisions are attached in Appendix A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

HackLibrary, Inc. is a Marshall corporation. (R. 4). HackLibrary,
Inc. is the creator of the web site known as "HackLibrary." (R. 4). HackLibrary is a library, similar to an electronic database, containing news
about successful computer hacker exploits, provided for public information and academic purposes. (R. 4). HackLibrary is one of at least five
web sites available to the public on the internet that contain this information. (R. 5). HackLibrary contains exact duplicates of hacked web
pages and presently archives in excess of two hundred copies of web
pages that have been the subject of previous hacker exploits. (R. 4). The
archive displays a disclaimer providing that copies of the hacked web
pages are made available for the sole purposes of academic research and
public information. (R. 4).
HackLibrary acquires a copy of a hacked web page when an employee downloads a copy of the page, or the hacker or other internet user
downloads a copy of the page onto HackLibrary's web site, usually anonymously. (R. 4). HackLibrary exercises no editorial control over which
hacked web pages are selected for inclusion on its site. (R. 4). Once
posted, the hacked web pages included in HackLibrary are instantly and
simultaneously available to all internet users. (R. 4). The public may
view the hacked site either by browsing the HackLibrary archive or
reach individual pages directly by searching the Internet using a web
search engine. (R. 5). HackLibrary is financed primarily by advertising
revenue and does not collect a fee from individual subscribers. (R. 4).
On January 15, 1999, ChiPost.com, the web site of the daily newspaper The Chicago Post, was hacked by persons calling themselves "MP3
TERRORISTZ" ("TERRORISTZ"). (R. 3). The TERRORISTZ replaced
the ChiPost.com website with its own web page. (R. 3). The hacked web
page displayed sexually explicit materials, a denunciation of copyright
law and intellectual property law, and critical statements about music
industry attorneys and executives. In the HTML source code, behind the
graphical image appearing to the general public on the web page, the
TERRORISTZ hid additional information. (R. 3). These hidden comments included personal information about two music industry executives. (R. 10-11). The personal information included Harry Wolfs
("Petitioner"), home address, phone number, email, birth date, social security number, fact of prior personal bankruptcy, and pending divorce
proceedings. (R. 10-11). The parties have stipulated that the statements
in the HTML source code are accurate. (R. 3).
The hacked version of ChiPost.com remained on its web site for approximately three hours. (R. 3-4). Although no records were kept of the
number of visitors during this three hour period, the average number of
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visitors on the ChiPost.com site per hour is somewhere in the thousands.
(R. 4). The copy of the ChiPost.com hacked web page was downloaded on
January 15, 1999 and made available in HackLibrary archive on January 18, 1999. (R. 5).
During the months following the hack of the ChiPost.com website,
Petitioner received various phone calls and email messages to his home
reflecting the contents of the hacked ChiPost.com website. (R. 5). Petitioner asked HackLibrary to remove the site or redact references to him,
but HackLibrary continued to display copies of sites that had already
been publicly displayed on the web. (R. 6).B.
B.

SumARuY

OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner sued HackLibrary in a Marshall State court for invasion
of privacy for alleged disclosure of private facts in the public forum. (R.
6). As an affirmative defense, HackLibrary asserted its statutory immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
("CDA"). (R. 6). The Madison County Circuit Court granted summary
judgment in favor of HackLibrary, ruling that it was immune from liability as an interactive computer service provider. (R. 6).
The First District Court of Appeals for the State of Marshall affirmed the trial court's decision, but on different grounds. (R. 6-7).
HackLibrary maintained that it is merely an interactive computer service that distributes previously available information provided by other
content providers. (R. 7). The Court of Appeals held that HackLibrary
was not immune under the CDA because it is both an interactive computer service provider and an information content provider, and cannot
be without liability just because another party authored the information.

(R. 7-8).
However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of HackLibrary on the
invasion of privacy claim. (R. 8-9). The State of Marshall recognizes the
tort of invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts, as set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). (R. 8). HackLibrary did not give publicity to Petitioner's private facts because the
information was not private at the time that HackLibrary added the
"MP3 TERRORISTZ" site to its archive. (R. 8). Also, the hacking of a
major newspaper's website is of legitimate concern to the public, and as
such, HackLibrary's publication of information is protected by the First
Amendment. (R. 9).
On July 27, 1999, this Court granted Petitioner's leave to appeal the
decision of the First District Court of Appeals affirming the Madison
County Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HackLibrary on the issues of statutory immunity under the CDA and invasion
of privacy. (R. 12).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

On de novo review, this Court should reinstate the summary judgment granted by the Madison County Circuit Court because HackLibrary, an interactive computer service, is statutorily immune from
speaker and publisher liability for information contained in the hacked
version of the ChiPost.com web page HackLibrary archived in its online
database. The evidence in the record demonstrates that there are no
genuine issues of material fact for trial, and summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law. Moreover, due to the nature of the conduct
at issue, "computer hacking," the Petitioner is unlikely to produce any
more information to create such an issue of fact for trial.
II.
HackLibrary's act of displaying and archiving a copy of the TERRORISTZ website does not invade Petitioner's privacy by publicizing private facts. As such, this Court should affirm the summary judgment
granted in favor of HackLibrary on the privacy issue.
Petitioner cannot state a cause of action because he cannot prove
that the archived information was private, publicized, offensive to a reasonable person, and not of legitimate public concern. The information
was not private because it was previously available from public records,
easily accessible public reference sources, and the original hacked ChiPost.com site. Further, if the original hacked site was not enough to give
publicity to Petitioner's personal information, then HackLibrary's
archive cannot be the impetus for the transformation from "private" to
"public" because the information was hidden in the source code. HackLibrary has a smaller, more specialized audience, and a visitor would
have to search through over two hundred HackLibrary archives to find
the site, as opposed to the instant access the original ChiPost.com site
provided.
Additionally, this Court can affirm the summary judgment because
offensiveness to a reasonable person and news worthiness can be decided
as a matter of law. If Petitioner had truly found the archived information to be offensive, then he should have petitioned the appropriate
courts to seal the records. Also, the hacking of a major newspaper's website is clearly a newsworthy item and of legitimate public concern. Because of the importance of preserving the matter of news worthiness,
HackLibrary should not be forced to deliberate as to the effect of publicizing each individual fact that had previously been available in the public
domain.
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Therefore, this Court should reinstate the Madison County Circuit
Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HackLibrary on the statutory immunity issue and affirm the First District Court of Appeals'
grant of summary judgment on the invasion of privacy issue.
ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of the State of Marshall should reinstate the
holding of the Madison County Circuit Court as to the statutory immunity of HackLibrary, Inc. ("HackLibrary") and affirm the holding of the
First District Court of Appeals, finding that HackLibrary is not liable for
the tort of invasion of privacy. The circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of HackLibrary because HackLibrary is statutorily immune, under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA")
from liability as the publisher or speaker of information provided by a
third party. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West Supp. 1999) ("Section 230").
Under Marshall Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is
appropriate, as a matter of law, if the evidence demonstrates there is no
genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Marshall R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Because HackLibrary has statutory immunity under the CDA which preempts all state
causes of action that are inconsistent with Section 230, including invasion of privacy, there are no issues of material fact for trial. See 47
U.S.C.A. § 230(b)(3).
Moreover, even if HackLibrary were not statutorily immune in this
case, Harry Wolf ("Petitioner") cannot prove the four elements of the
public disclosure of private facts tort: that the information archived by
HackLibrary was private, publicized, highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and not of legitimate public concern. Accordingly, the First District Court of Appeals' decision should be affirmed in part and reversed
in part.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED HACKLIBRARY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE CONGRESS
EXPRESSLY IMMUNIZED INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICES
LIKE HACKLIBRARY FROM PUBLISHER LIABILITY FOR THE
WORKS OF THIRD PARTIES, IN THE COMMUNICATIONS
DECENCY ACT.

HackLibrary, an interactive computer service, has statutory immunity from Petitioner's cause of action for invasion of privacy. Whether a
service provider like HackLibrary meets the statutory criteria for "interactive computer service" is an issue of first impression. However, the
breadth of the statutory immunity is not. To date, at least two courts
have interpreted Section 230 as creating a nearly absolute "federal im-
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munity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable
for information originating with a third-party user of the service." See
Zeran v. America Online Inc., 129 F. 3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.C. 1998).
Furthermore, HackLibrary can not be liable for the tort of invasion
of privacy because the MP3 TERRORISTZ ("TERRORISTZ") were responsible for the comments encoded in the HTML source code on the
hacked version of ChiPost.com. The TERRORISTZ created, and had
complete editorial control over the message, and thus were the exclusive
information content provider in the instant case. As such, HackLibrary
falls squarely within the four corners of Section 230, making it immune
from liability for the content of messages posted by a third party.
A.

HACKLIBRARY IS AN INTERACTIVE COMPUTER SERVICE STATUTORILY
IMMUNE FROM PUBLISHER OR SPEAKER LIABILITY UNDER THE

CDA.

This Court should affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HackLibrary because the plain language of Section 230
creates both publisher and speaker immunity for HackLibrary as an interactive computer service. As a general rule, plain language controls
the construction of a statute. See Bread PoliticalAction Comm. v. Federal Election Comm., 455 U.S. 577, 580 (1982). Section 230(f)(2) reads
[Tihe term 'interactive computer service' means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and
such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.
47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2).
1.

HackLibrary is an "informationservice" under the CDA.

HackLibrary is an information service. Although the term "information service" is not defined in Section 230, Section 3(b) of the CDA provides that, unless defined, terms used in the CDA have the same
meaning as the terms in 47 U.S.C. § 153. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 153 (West
Supp. 1999)(historical notes). 47 U.S.C. § 153 (20) defines the term "information service" as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making
available information via telecommunications and includes electronic
publishing." Because HackLibrary acquires, stores and has the capability to retrieve copies of hacked web pages from its archives, HackLibrary
fits the statutory definition of information service. In addition, HackLibrary develops and electronically publishes original works in the form
of "hacker news and information" on its website (R. 4). Thus, HackLibrary is an information service under the CDA.
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HackLibrary is an "informationsystem" under the CDA.

In addition, HackLibrary is an information system. The term "information system" is not defined in Section 230 or 47 U.S.C. § 153. Thus,
unless otherwise defined, words used by Congress in enacting a statute
should be interpreted as having their "ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning." See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Information system is defined elsewhere in 44 U.S.C. § 3502 (8) as "a discrete set
of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information." Thus,
this Court should interpret the definition in 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(8) as the
contemporary definition of "information system." By using its website as
a resource to organize, maintain and disseminate both news about
hacker exploits, and the products of those exploits, namely the web pages
in its archive, HackLibrary is also an information system under the
CDA.
3.

HackLibrary enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, and is therefore immune from liability under
the CDA.

As a website, HackLibrary enables computer access by multiple
users, including its own employees. (R. 4). HackLibrary also enables access by the general public in the form of Internet visitors, to the server
on which it uploads, stores, and archives its more than two-hundred
hacked web pages. (R. 4). HackLibrary's web site is stored on a server
connected to the Internet, and the web pages on that website may be
viewed by anyone using a web browser. See Laura Lemay, Teach Yourself More Web PublishingWith HTML in a Week, 273 (Sams.net) (1995).
Hence, by enabling users to view archived pages, original news and information, those users are accessing HackLibrary's server with their
computer each time they visit the HackLibrary website.
Thus, HackLibrary meets both the Section 230 definition for information service and information system, only one of which is necessary
under the CDA. Furthermore, HackLibrary enables computer access by
multiple users, including its employees and the public at large using the
Internet with a browser, to a computer server on which its files are
stored. Thus, applying the plain language of Section 230(f)(2), HackLibrary is an interactive computer service immunized from publisher or
speaker liability under the CDA.
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IN ADDITION TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE CDA, THE LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY LEAVES NO DOUBT HACKLIBRARY IS A MEMBER OF THE CLASS
CONGRESS INTENDED TO IMMUNIZE AS AN INTERACTIVE COMPUTER
SERVICE UNDER THE

CDA.

In addition to the plain language of Section 230, immunizing HackLibrary as an interactive computer service, Congress' legislative intent
in enacting the CDA was to expressly immunize defendants like HackLibrary from liability for information disseminated on its website by a
third party like the TERRORISTZ. It is significant that Congress chose

the term "interactive computer service" in Section 230, rather than "internet service provider," "commercial online service," or "computer information service." See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D.
573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 444, 447 (E.D. Va. 1998); America Online, Inc. v.
GreatDeals.Net, 49 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854 (E.D. Va. 1999); Compuserve
Inc. v. Patterson,89 F.3d 1257, 1259 (6th Cir. 1996). The legislative history of the CDA reveals that Senators used terms like "online service
provider" or simply "online provider" when they debated this legislation
on the floor of the Senate. See 141 Cong. Rec. H8460-01 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1995) (statement of Sen. Cox); 141 Cong. Rec. S8310-03 (daily ed. June
14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Coats). As such, Congress made a policy

choice when it enacted the CDA using the term interactive computer service. That policy choice was to immunize a broader range of service providers than large online subscriber services with millions of customers
like Compuserve, America Online ("AOL"), Prodigy and Microsoft, all of
which provide access to the internet and allow their users to access proprietary software, services, bulletin boards, databases, and online chat
forums. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328-29; Matthew C. Siderits, Defamation
in Cyberspace: Reconciling Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc. and Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 79 MARQ. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (1996).
Furthermore, the legislative history of the CDA expressly contemplates immunity for non-subscriber entities such as HackLibrary. The
legislative history of the CDA reveals that the protections of Section 230
were intended to apply to "all interactive computer services... including
non-subscriber systems such as those operated by many businesses for

employee use." See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 176 (1996)(emphasis
added). HackLibrary is a non-subscriber entity because it does not maintain individual accounts for users in exchange for a monthly or per usage

fee. Instead, the HackLibrary website provides news and information
about successful hacker exploits and is financed by advertising revenues.
(R. 4). HackLibrary's primary purpose is to display hacked websites for
academic research and public information. (R. 4). Users are able to interact with HackLibrary by way of accessing and searching its archives
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and uploading information about hacked websites for inclusion in its
database. In this respect, HackLibrary has attributes of both the large
online service provider, and the non-subscriber system such as those operated for employee use.
To hold HackLibrary liable as the publisher or speaker of a hacked
web page created by a third party, while immunizing other interactive
computer services like America Online, providing users with a front-end
to the internet in exchange for subscriber fees, would undercut the
CDA's basic objective. Congress' basic objective in enacting the CDA was
to "target content providers, not access providers or users." See Robert
Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon's Communications Decency Act: Regulating Barbarianson the Information Superhighway, 49
FED. Comm. L.J. 51, 58 (1996). As such, this Court should find that
HackLibrary is an interactive computer service Congress intended to immunize from publisher or speaker liability when it enacted the CDA.
C.

THE

"TERRORISTZ"

WERE THE THIRD PARTY INFORMATION CONTENT

PROVIDERS OF THE HACKED CHIPOST.COM WEB PAGE.

The circuit court's holding that HackLibrary was not an "information content provider" in this instance should be reinstated. HackLibrary displayed an exact duplicate of the hacked version of the
ChiPost.com web page created by the TERRORISTZ, without altering its
content or appearance. Thus, the TERRORISTZ, the original creator, is
culpable for any cause of action arising from the content of this web page.
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. When it enacted the CDA, Congress expressly contemplated this result. See id. at 331. Congress reasoned that
it would be impossible for services like HackLibrary to screen every
message and posting on its service, and as a consequence, providers
might choose to "severely restrict" messages these providers allow their
audience to post. See id. This would impede Congress' policy of
"promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet," and "encouraging technology development to maximize user control over what information is received by individuals ... who use the Internet." See 47 U.S.C.
230 (b)(2)-(3). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of HackLibrary is
mandated under the CDA.
Section 230(f)(3) defines "information content provider" as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service." See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Although the
identity of the TERRORISTZ is unknown in the instant case, and may
never be known, it would still be logical to conclude that it is a person or
entity. Because the TERRORISTZ "hacked" the web site of ChiPost.com,

1999]

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

and made their information available through the Internet, the TERRORISTZ are also the information content provider in the instant case.
1. Modern technological advances make it impossible to hold
HackLibrary legally responsible under traditionalpublisher and
distributorliability.
Before the CDA was enacted, at least one court recognized that it
was difficult to enforce traditional common law notions of publisher and
distributor liability on the Internet. See Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc.,
776 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In Cubby, the court granted Compuserve's Motion for Summary Judgment. See id. at 141. The court
found that it was unreasonable to require Compuserve to check all third
party publications it carried for defamatory contents, when a traditional
distributor like a bookstore was not required to authenticate all of the
works it carried on its shelves. See id. at 140-41; see also Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line CommunicationServs., 907 F. Supp. 1361,
1367-69 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that a bulletin board service ("BBS")
was not liable for direct copyright infringement for third party posting
because of the "automatic and indiscriminate" conduct in simply providing a system capable of sending messages to subscribers).
In 1996, Congress passed the CDA to specifically eliminate common
law publisher and speaker liability for interactive service providers. In
enacting the CDA, Congress legislatively overruled the 1995 case of
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229,
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996). In
Stratton, the court held that because Prodigy marketed itself as a family
online service provider that controlled content, it was liable, like a newspaper, for publishing libelous statements posted by a third party. See
Stratton, 1995 N.Y. Misc. at *10-11. The court found that because Prodigy claimed to censor materials available on its service, it was appropriate to hold Prodigy to a higher standard than other similarly situated
online service providers that did not censor. See id. at 10, 13. Congress
specifically overruled the Stratton decision because it treated providers
and users as publishers or speakers of content created by a third party.
See H.R. Conf. Rep. No 104-458, at 194 (1996).
2. Modern courts have expanded, ratherthan retreated from decisions
holding interactive service providers like HackLibrary absolutely
immune from liability for works created by third parties.
HackLibrary is not liable for the content of the web page created by
the TERRORISTZ. Since the CDA was enacted in 1996, courts deciding
this issue consistently hold that no cause of action can be maintained
against an interactive computer service for content created by a third
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party over which the service had no editorial control. See Zeran, 129
F.3d at 330; Doe v. America Online, Inc., 718 So. 2d 385, 389 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1998), rehearinggranted, 729 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1999)(granting
summary judgment in favor of AOL because Section 230 rendered AOL
immune from prosecution for a third-party's marketing and distribution
of "kiddie porn" in photos and videos via one of AOL's online chat rooms,
violating a local statute).
Zeran is the seminal case in the new frontier of interactive computer
service liability after the passage of the CDA. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at
327. Zeran is factually analogous to the instant case. In Zeran, an anonymous user posted repeated messages on an AOL bulletin board advertising t-shirts with slogans like "Visit Oklahoma ... It's a BLAST" and
"McVeigh for President 1996," with instructions to call the Zeran home
to order. See Zeran, 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 n. 3 (E.D. Va. 1997). Zeran
was instantly deluged with phone calls and death threats. See Zeran,
129 F.3d. at 329. At one point, Zeran received a harassing call every two
minutes. See id. Zeran contacted AOL and requested it remove the BBS
postings and print a retraction. See id. AOL complied, but refused to
print the retraction. See id.
Zeran filed suit against AOL for defamation, contending that AOL
had a duty to remove the posting, notify subscribers of the hoax, and
screen future messages, once he notified AOL of the problem. See id. at
330. AOL asserted Section 230 as its affirmative defense. See id. The
court held that actions like Zeran's were barred by Section 230 because
these actions thrust a service provider like AOL into the traditional role
of a publisher. See id. The court further explained that its holding
would not preclude another case against the third party who posted the
messages if that party were identified. See id.
Although Zeran contended that AOL should be liable under distributor liability, the court dismissed this argument as a "subspecies" of publisher liability. See id. at 332. The court further stated that because
"publication" of a statement is a "necessary element in a defamation action, only one who publishes can be subject to tort liability for defamation." See id. The court explained that AOL fell within the definition of
publisher under the CDA because "everyone who takes part in the publication.., is charged with publication." See id. at 332 (quoting Tacket v.
GeneralMotors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 1987)). As such,
the court found that imposing liability upon AOL would violate the policy
behind the CDA, namely discouraging self-regulation. See id. at 333.
Furthermore, the Zeran court held it would not assume Congress
intended to impose liability on an interactive service provider simply because it had notice of potential defamation. See id.; see also Blumenthal,
992 F. Supp. at 52. The Zeran court reasoned that if this were the case,
anyone could simply contact AOL and claim a posting was defamatory,
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triggering the obligation for AOL to remove the posting. See Zeran, 129
F.3d at 333; see also Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfield, PublisherLiability
in Cyberspace, 509 PLI PAT. 763, 770 (1998) (suggesting that Internet
providers would be inclined to remove messages that created the potential for liability when they received a complaint, "just to be safe").
Other courts have found that even if the identity of the person who
commits defamation is known to the service provider, that does not
change the result under the CDA. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.
Supp at 51-52. In Blumenthal, the plaintiff sued AOL for defamatory
statements posted by one of its licensors on a publication known as the
"Drudge Report." See id. at 47. The Blumenthal court held, consistent
with the Fourth Circuit in Zeran, that Congress' policy choice to statutorily immunize interactive service providers like AOL was dispositive of
the issue in Blumenthal, granting summary judgment in favor of AOL.
See id. at 52-53. What the Blumenthal court did make clear, however,
was that it believed the CDA left liability intact for "joint content providers" although that was not the case in Blumenthal. See id. at 51.
Another court has expanded the scope of the rule in Zeran and Blumenthal even one step further, prohibiting a plaintiff from engaging in
discovery against an interactive service provider. See Ben Ezra, Weinstein and Co. v. America Online Inc., No. CIV. 97-485 LHILFG, 1998 WL
896459 (D.N.M. July 16, 1998) (slip op.), summary judgment granted in
27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794 (D.N.M. Mar. 1, 1999). The Ben Ezra court
found that Congress intended to immunize interactive computer services
from "the burdens of litigation" as well as liability. See id. at *2.
Thus, the current state of the law with respect to third party content
providers is that it makes no difference whether the third party is anonymous or contractually related to the interactive service provider, both
are treated as "information content providers." See Zeran, 129 F.3d. at
330; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp at 47. In addition, courts have concluded
that distributor liability is a subspecies of the publisher liability that
Congress intended to eliminate through the CDA. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at
332. Thus, regardless of the knowledge of the interactive computer service, there is no affirmative duty to take action, censor or post retractions
for defamatory content provided by third parties. See id. at 333.
It appears clear from the foregoing decisions under the CDA that
Section 230 does not protect an interactive service provider that creates
the content it seeks immunity for. See Blumenfield, 509 PLI PAT. at 771.
In addition, the Blumenthal court refused to rule out the possibility that
the CDA may leave intact a cause of action for joint liability where the
service participates in "joint development of content." See id. at 51. In
the instant case, HackLibrary has no formal policy to select the hacked
web pages it includes in its collection and does not take part in the crea-
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tion of the pages it displays and archives. (R. 4). Furthermore, an Internet user may submit pages to HackLibrary anonymously. (R. 4).
In the instant case, Petitioner requested that HackLibrary either remove the hacked ChiPost.com web page from its archive, or in the alternative, redact the references implicating him. (R. 5-6). In the first
instance, under Section 230, an interactive service provider may, but is
under no statutory or common law obligation to make a judgment regarding the lawfulness of an information content provider's message. It
would be an onerous burden to require every interactive service provider
to investigate the truthfulness of every utterance of a third party on the
Internet. This is a result Congress did not intend when it enacted the
CDA.
Secondly, it is at least arguable that redacting the personal information from the HTML source code would give rise to a cause of action
under the rationale in Blumenthal as a "joint content provider" for contributing to the content of the hacked ChiPost.com web page. In essence,
Petitioner was asking HackLibrary to make modifications to a file located on a computer server, to re-save that file and to republish it in its
altered form. Furthermore, Section 230 does not specifically insulate an
interactive service provider from liability for altering or redacting materials provided by an information content provider. Section 230 only confers statutory immunity upon interactive service providers who "restrict
access or availability of material." See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). There is
no mention of statutory immunity for redacting content. Arguably, compliance with Petitioner's requests may have caused HackLibrary to surrender its statutory immunity and assume the role of a content provider.
The First District Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that
HackLibrary was not statutorily immune from liability because it was
the one who "dredge[d] up defamatory, infringing, or otherwise actionable information." Once an interactive service provider, like HackLibrary,
satisfies Section 230, it is absolutely immune, so long as it maintains a
passive role with respect to the content of the information. In other
words, when the interactive service provider has no responsibility for the
content of a message, and exercises no editorial control over the content
of a message like the message in the HTML source code of the ChiPost.com web page, Congress has made a policy choice to insulate that
provider. This Court should not follow in footsteps of the First District
Court of Appeal, and should decline to legislate from the bench. Accordingly, this Court should reinstate the circuit court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of HackLibrary.
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT
HACKLIBRARY DID NOT INVADE PETITIONER'S PRIVACY BY
DISPLAYING AND ARCHIVING THE "TERRORISTZ" VERSION OF
CHIPOST.COM.
HackLibrary did not invade Petitioner's privacy by displaying and
archiving the "TERRORISTZ" version of ChiPost.com. The State of Marshall recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy by giving publicity to private life ("public disclosure tort"), as set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts ("Restatement"). (R. 8). To hold HackLibrary liable for
the public disclosure tort, Petitioner must prove that the matter was private, publicized, highly offensive to a reasonable person, and not of legitimate concern to the public. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D
(1977). Because Petitioner cannot prove all four elements of the public
disclosure tort, and it is unlikely that Petitioner will be able to produce
additional facts that create a genuine issue of material fact for trial, this
Court should affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals by holding that
HackLibrary did not invade Petitioner's privacy.
A.

HACKLIBRARY ARCHIVED INFORMATION THAT WAS AVAILABLE FROM
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

Petitioner cannot prove that HackLibrary archived private information, because all of the facts that were hidden in the HTML source code
were available from the public domain. To have a cause of action for
public disclosure tort, the Petitioner must ultimately prove that such
facts were private. See Restatement section 652D.
1.

The information was available from public records.

HackLibrary did not invade Petitioner's privacy because it archived
information that was available from public records. For example, when
Petitioner filed for personal bankruptcy, he was required by law to fill
out a Voluntary Petition, which requested his name, alias, social security/tax identification number, address, telephone number, county of residence or principal place of business, and extensive financial information.
See 11 U.S.C.A., Official Bankruptcy Form 1. The Voluntary Petition is a
public record under 11 U.S.C. § 107(a), and as such, is "open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge." 11 U.S.C. §107(a)
(1999). Section 107(a) also empowers a court to protect a person "with
respect to scandalous or defamatory matter contained in a paper filed" in
a bankruptcy case. Id.
Additionally, states have enacted legislation that similarly authorizes access to public records. The California Legislature, "mindful of the
right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental
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and necessary right of every person in this state." See CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 6250 (West 1999). Public records usually include all documents and
other materials, "regardless of the physical form, characteristics or
means of transmission, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or
in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency."
See FLA. STAT. Ch. 119.011 (1999). Divorce actions, including Petitioner's, are accessible under public records acts because parties are required to file a petition, pursuant to statutory guidelines, with the court.
See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 105 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. CH. § 61.043
(West 1999).
Furthermore, comment b to section 652D states that there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about a person's life that are matters of
public record, including date of birth, and fact of marriage. Some states
have constitutional provisions that mandate courts be "open" and "accessible." See Petition of Keene Sentinel, 612 A.2d 911, 915-16 (N.H. 1992).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court clarified that its courts were "public
forums." See id. Thus, a citizen seeking a divorce must unavoidably do
so in a public forum, and as a result, many family and marital matters
become public. See id. Unfortunately, parties "seeking a dissolution of
their marriage are not entitled to a private court proceeding just because
they are required to utilize the judicial system." See id. at 916 (citing
Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 119 (Fla.
1988). Under the New Jersey Constitution, the public has a right of access to court proceedings and to court records that cannot be unreasonably restricted. See id.
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has held that "interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on
the public record." See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95
(1975). In Cox, the father of a rape victim sued the parent company of a
television station for reporting the name of the victim. See id. at 474.
The reporter learned the name of the rape victim from an examination of
the indictments that were available for inspection in the courtroom. See
id. at 473. The father based his suit on a Georgia statute that made it a
misdemeanor to publish or broadcast the name of a rape victim. See id.
at 474. While recognizing that there is a zone of privacy around an individual within which a state may protect from press intrusion, the Court
was reluctant to make public records available to the media, while simultaneously prohibiting publication if potentially offensive to the reasonable person. See id. at 496.
The Court warned that doing so would "invite timidity and self-censorship" and result in the suppression of information that should be
made available to the public. See id. Moreover, public records are by
their very nature of interest to the public, and the public benefits from
the reporting of the accurate contents. See id. at 495. This is the very
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right that is critically important in preserving a type of government in
which the "citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public
business." See id. Ultimately, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing true information disclosed in public court documents open for
public inspection. See id. at 496.
One court has interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in Cox to
amount to an absolute privilege to republicize matters in the public record, no matter how offensive or private. See Dresbach v. Doubleday &
Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (D.D.C. 1981). Ultimately, courts have held
that as long as the plaintiff obtains information from a public record, the
publication of a matter does not constitute an invasion of privacy. See
Cape Publications,Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989)
(holding that information lawfully obtained from public records by a
newspaper regarding child abuse did not result in tort of public disclosure of private facts).
Given the overwhelming case law in support of the ability to publicize information in the public records, Petitioner cannot support his
claim of invasion of privacy because the general matters and specific information contained in TERRORISTZ were all available from public
records. That is, the fact that he filed bankruptcy and the details of that
bankruptcy, including date of the filing, social security number, home
address, home phone number were all available from the Voluntary Petition the Petitioner filled out. Also, the fact that Petitioner's wife had
filed for divorce, alleging abandonment and infidelity, was available from
court records. Even though the information archived by HackLibrary
may have been personal to Petitioner, and Petitioner may not have
wanted the information to be archived, the information certainly was not
"private" because it was accessible through public records.
2.

The information was available from easily accessible sources.

As to the other three pieces of archived information, Petitioner's law
school graduation date, date of birth and personal email address, they
were readily accessible from other public sources. Petitioner's law school
graduation and date of birth, because he is general counsel for
MoneyMusic, Inc., is available from the Martindale-Hubbell directory.
See Martindale-HubbellLegal Directory,<http://www.martindalehubbell
.com>. Petitioner's personal email address is available from search engines on the Internet, such as Yahoo.com, which also provides home address and phone number, or Lycos.com. See Yahoo People Search, <http:/
/www.people.yahoo.com>; Lycos E-Mail Addresses, <http://www.
whowhere.lycos.com/Email>. These directories are widely accessible by
any individual who has access to the Internet, and with the advent of
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technology, such searches are simpler than thumbing through the yellow
or white pages.
3.

Compilation of information available from public domain does not
transform it into "private"information.

Petitioner may argue that the information, although contained in
the public domain, was "private" because HackLibrary archived a compilation of the information. In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), the
Supreme Court held that disclosure of the contents of an FBI rap sheet
could result in an invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private information and would fit within law enforcement exemption of the federal
Freedom of Information Act. The Court stated that there is a "vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent
search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations
throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a
clearinghouse of information." See id. at 764.
In interpreting the Reporters Committee case, the District Court for
New Jersey noted that it addressed privacy interests under the Freedom
of Information Act, not the constitution, and thus its analysis was unhelpful in analyzing Megan's Law cases, which implicate the Eighth
Amendment. See Paul P. v. Verniero, 982 F. Supp. 961, 967 n.10 (D.N.J.
1997). Moreover, the court held that plaintiffs interest in compiled information, which would otherwise remain "scattered" or "wholly forgotten" are within the "zones of privacy" protected by the Constitution. See
id. at 966. Ultimately, the court reasoned that it is of "little consequence
whether this public information is disclosed piecemeal or whether it is
disclosed in compilation." See id. at 967.
Similarly, in the instant case, it does not matter whether Petitioner's information is disclosed piecemeal or through HackLibrary's
archived TERRORISTZ page. With the advent of Internet technology,
numerous public records are available through searches on the Internet
or from legal directories, such as WestLaw. See Westlaw, Public Information, Records, and Filings <http://www.westlaw.com>. One can access the files of a bankruptcy court through the Internet and conduct a
search using any number of terms, including name, social security
number, or creditor. See RACER Bankruptcy Case Search, <http:l
www.id.uscourts.gov/wconnect /wc.dll?usbcracer'main>. The diligent
search of the archives of every courthouse basement in Reporters Committee is no longer necessary, as the task of obtaining such information
can be easily accomplished through a one-hour session online. Furthermore, the compilation in Reporters Committee was assembled by a
branch of the government, the FBI, and the issue was whether the FBI
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could release the compiled rap sheet under the Freedom of Information
Act, as distinguishable from the unknown party that compiled the information from separate public records in the instant case. Ultimately, the
instant case involves a private party and the absence of state action.
4.

The information had been previously publicized on the original
ChiPost.com website.

HackLibrary did not invade Petitioner's privacy because it archived
information that had been previously publicized on the original ChiPost.com website. Matters already publicly released in a "periodical or
newspaper of local or regional circulation" cannot be deemed "private."
See Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1219 (D.C. 1989). In Wolf, the
plaintiff sued a monthly informational magazine for invasion of privacy
by giving publicity to his private life. See id. at 1216. A magazine had
contacted the plaintiff requesting an interview, but plaintiff ultimately
refused to give details regarding his business practices and only briefly
commented about his legal work. See id. at 1215. The magazine subsequently published a short biographical entry on plaintiff in September
1985. See id. The account included information about his shares in a
bank, location of his business and the fact that he owned the building,
and the address for another building he jointly owned. See id. One year
later, the September 1986 issue republished the same, but abbreviated,
information as the earlier publication. See id. at 1216. The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment of the trial court in favor of the
magazine because the facts in the two articles were a matter of public
record or readily available to "anyone who would wish to ascertain it."
See id. at 1218-19. As such, the facts obtained from public records or
already publicly released media cannot be considered private. See id.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that subsequent publication of a previously publicized matter does not support a
cause of action for invasion of privacy. See Dotson v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 165 F.3d 27 (6th Cir. 1998). In Dotson, the plaintiff allegedly had
shoplifted and was arrested, and a local newspaper reported the incident. See id. at *1. Defendant's agents distributed the investigative report of the incident by mailing copies to plaintiffs supervisors and by
placing a copy on plaintiffs car windshield. See id. The court, in referring to the Restatement, held that because the newspaper had reported
an incident before the defendant's disclosure, the latter disclosure was
only a "further publication of matters previously published to the public
at large." See id. at *2.
Likewise, in Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d
1040, 1047 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1984), the court held that a newspaper
had an additional ground for exemption from liability, because the maga-
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zine merely republished the original article. The court reasoned that is
"axiomatic that no right of privacy attaches to a matter of general interest that has already been publicly released in a periodical or in a newspaper of local or regional circulation." See id. at 1048.
In the instant case, HackLibrary merely displayed and archived a
duplicate of the original TERRORISTZ page. HackLibrary neither added nor deleted information. Upon the hackers displaying the TERRORISTZ page, the information was available for the entire Internet
public to view. Between the very moment the site was hacked and replaced until the moment that ChiPost.com's site administrator took the
page down, thousands of people probably visited the site. Therefore, Petitioner cannot reasonably assert that the information that was subsequently archived was "private."
B.

HACKLIBRARY DID NOT GIVE PUBLICITY TO PETITIONER'S PERSONAL

INFORMATION BECAUSE THE INFORMATION WAS HIDDEN IN THE

HTML

SOURCE CODE OF THE ARCHIVE AND THE ARCHIVE WAS ACCESSIBLE BY A
SMALLER AUDIENCE THAN THAT OF CHIPOST.COM.

If this Court finds that the personal information remained "private"
after being published on the original TERRORISTZ page, then HackLibrary cannot be liable for publicizing private facts by merely archiving
the page and limiting availability to a significantly smaller audience. A
claim under section 652D requires Petitioner to prove HackLibrary gave
publicity to a private fact of Petitioner's. Comment a to section 652D
further differentiates between "publicity" and "publication." Publication
is a word of art, which includes any communication. However, publicity
requires that the matter must be communicated to "the public at large or
to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as on of general
knowledge." See Pinkston-Adams v. Nike, Inc., 1999 WL 54302 at *3
(N.D. Ill. 1999)(citing Chisholm v. Foothill Capital Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d
925, 940 (N.D. Ill. 1998)(citing Restatement of Torts (Second), § 652D,
comment a)).
In the instant case, the HTML source code for the TERRORISTZ
page contained personal information about Petitioner, encoded as comments, which is not normally displayed by most web browsers. (R. 3).
Therefore, if the information was not specifically accessed enough by the
thousands of visitors to the ChiPost.com website to render the information public, then the information was even more unlikely to be publicized
through the archive. HackLibrary maintains a website containing
"hacker news and information." (R. 4). As such, the number of visitors
to HackLibrary, a specialized site, is logically smaller than that of ChiPost.com, a generally known, widely accessed site. Furthermore, the
archive includes copies of over two hundred different hacked web sites.
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(R. 4). Given the voluminous number of archives, HackLibrary visitors
would likely have to winnow through over two hundred other archives to
find TERRORISTZ, and then proceed to uncover the hidden comments.
This starkly contrasts with a visit to the ChiPost.com site, which receives thousands of visitors each hour. (R. 5). Otherwise, a user may
reach the individually archived HackLibrary pages directly, often by using a web search engine. Under this method, a user may stumble upon
the TERRORISTZ archive, or would have to engage in a detailed, on
point search. Given this, it is unlikely that HackLibrary provided the
impetus to transform the personal information into public information, if
thousands of visitors per hour accessing the original TERRORISTZ page
on ChiPost.com does not constitute giving publicity to private facts.
C.

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE ARCHIVED

TERRORISTZ

SITE

IS NOT OFFENSIVE OR OBJECTIONABLE TO A REASONABLE PERSON.

Petitioner must also prove that the archived information was offensive or objectionable to reasonable person. Offensiveness is relative to
the customs of "time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to
the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens." See Restatement section
652D. An individual only has a cause of action if the publicity given is
such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling "seriously
aggrieved" by it. See id.
The archived information is not offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person as a matter of law. Whether the publication of an allegedly private fact rises to the level of 'highly offensive' is a question of law
for the court to decide. See Chisholm, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 941. A court
should consider the conduct, context, and circumstances surrounding the
publication, as well as the publication itself. See id. (citing Green v. Chicago Tribune Co., 675 N.E.2d 249, 254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
In the instant case, the context, conduct and circumstances demonstrate that archiving a hacked website should not be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. The implicit message in the comments
was to criticize Petitioner's involvement in the entertainment industry.
As such, HackLibrary could not have archived the information, after censoring it, and still have maintained the integrity of the original message.
Furthermore, if Petitioner truly believed that the information HackLibrary archived was offensive or objectionable, he should have petitioned the respective courts that had jurisdiction over the records to seal
the information. Similarly, he should have unlisted his home address,
phone number, and email address from the various publicly available
reference sources. Finally, as an attorney doing business in the State of
Marshall, he should have redacted his birth date and law school graduation date from the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory. Since the record
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does not reflect that Petitioner chose these precautions to prevent publicity to information available in the public domain, he has no basis to feel
"seriously aggrieved" by HackLibrary's act of archiving TERRORISTZ.
D.

THE ARCHIVED

TERRORISTZ

AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED

THEREIN IS OF LEGITIMATE PUBLIC INTEREST AND NEWSWORTHY.

Petitioner must prove that the archived information was not of legitimate public concern. See Shulman v. Group W Productions,Inc., 955
P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998)(citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D
(1977)). This requirement is also characterized as "newsworthiness" and
is a complete bar to the public disclosure of private facts tort. The analysis of news worthiness inevitably involves balancing conflicting interests
in personal privacy and the First Amendment right to freedom of the
press. See id. When HackLibrary displayed and archived TERRORISTZ, it "published" on the Web because it made information available on the Web. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
1. Summary judgment is especially appropriatein the instant case
because the FirstAmendment right to free press is implicated.
In Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307 (10th Cir.
1981), the court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment
in favor of the publisher, holding that "objective and reasonable minds
cannot differ" in finding the article to constitute public disclosure of private facts. The court further explained that a judge should make a
threshold determination of whether a jury question exists, especially
when civil cases may have a chilling effect on First Amendment rights.
See id. at 309 n. 1. This determination acts as a "buffer" against possible
First Amendment interferences. See id. Specifically, in Gilbert, requiring the publisher to undergo a trial would "unnecessarily chill the exercise of their first amendment right to publish newsworthy information."
See id.
Similarly in the instant case, this Court should affirm the lower
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HackLibrary, because allowing this case to proceed to trial would impair HackLibrary's right to
publish newsworthy information about website hacking. Furthermore,
holding otherwise would hamper the ability of individuals and groups to
publish newsworthy information in a rapidly developing medium of communication. The Internet enables people to "communicate with one another with unprecedented speed and efficiency and is rapidly
revolutionizing how people share and receive information." See Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 48.
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2. The hacking of websites is of legitimate public concern, and
HackLibrary maintains its archives, including TERRORISTZ, for
educational and researchpurposes.
HackLibrary displayed and archived information that was newsworthy and of legitimate public concern. Generally speaking, hackers
and hacked websites have been a nuisance to varying entities, whether
public or private. For example, the FBI has noted an increase in attacks
on federal websites recently. See David McGuire, Hackers Strike Another Federal Website, Newsbytes News Network (August 11, 1999). An
FBI spokesperson has even commented that the FBI takes "all attacks
on websites seriously." See id. Such attacks are so anticipated and
alarming that all 56 FBI field offices have a computer squad equipped to
investigate computer crime. See id. Specifically, these computer squads
investigate interference with government computer systems, including a
noted attack by a member of the "Global Hell" group that hacked into a
protected Army computer at the Pentagon and altered its contents. See
Robert MacMillan, FBI Tries to Crack Global Hell Ringleader, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, August 31, 1999. "Interference with government computer systems are not just electronic vandalism; they run the
risk of compromising critical information infrastructure systems." See
id.
Given the severe repercussions of hacking websites, it is indisputable that HackLibrary archived information that was of legitimate public
concern. Potentially thousands of unsuspecting visitors to the original
ChiPost.com site were surprised with vivid pornographic images and
strong opinions regarding the law and certain people involved in the music industry. These visitors were probably average citizens visiting the
site to read about the day's news, as this was the website for a Chicago
newspaper. Therefore, HackLibrary did not violate Petitioner's privacy
because it archived information of legitimate public concern.
Also, newsworthiness is not limited to news in the "narrow sense of
reports of current events." See Shulman v. Group W Prod. Inc-86 (Cal.
1998). It extends to use of names or facts in giving information to the
public for the "purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment,
when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published." See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, § 652D, com. j). Therefore, because HackLibrary's archive bears
a disclaimer stating that the "copies of the hacked sites are made available solely for purposes of academic research and public information,"
HackLibrary is not liable for invasion of privacy. (R. 4).
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3. Even if this Court finds that Petitioner'spersonal information is
"private," there is a logical nexus between Petitioner'spersonal life and
the archiving of TERRORISTZ.
As long as there is a logical nexus or some substantial relevance between the complaining individual and the matter of legitimate public interest, there is no invasion of privacy. See Shulman, 955 P. 2d at 484
(citing Campbell v. Seabury Press, 614 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Moreover, if a matter is within the sphere of legitimate public interest or
concern, facts related to the subject that would "otherwise be deemed
private may be considered newsworthy." See Ferraro v. City of Long
Branch, 714 A.2d 945, 956 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998)(citing Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 284 (N.J. 1988)).
In Shulman, the plaintiff was involved in a serious accident and injured. The defendant videotaped the rescue scene, and the subsequent
broadcast included extensive footage of the entire rescue, with graphic
clips of the difficult extrication from the car and the medical attention
she received at the scene. See Shulman, 955 P. 2d at 475. The court held
that the subject matter of the broadcast was of legitimate public concern
because car accidents are by their very nature of interest to a large portion of the public. See id. at 488. Additionally, the court found that the
specific detailed footage of the rescue was newsworthy as well, because
the degree of truthful detail was essential to the narrative. See id.
Likewise, in the instant case, the general subject matter of hacked
websites is of legitimate concern to the public. The detailed comments
concerning Petitioner was essential to the archive because it related to
the general theme of the hacked website. That is, the web page that
displayed pornographic materials also contained information related to
music industry executives and copyright and intellectual property law.
Petitioner is general counsel for MoneyMusic, Inc. and has contact with
music artists. The comments hidden in the HTML source code refer to
opinions. Although personal in nature, it was logically relevant to the
general subject matter of the web page.
Arguably, because of Petitioner's extensive involvement in the music
industry and contact with music artists, he may have become an involuntary public figure. Petitioner is an individual who may not have sought
publicity or consented to it, but through his own conduct, he has become
a legitimate subject of public interest. See Restatement section 652D.
He is employed in the music industry and represents high profile music
artists. It was his involvement in the music industry that caused him to
be the target of the TERRORISTZ. Therefore, the matter of Petitioner
himself was of public interest, beyond website hacking. As such, the hidden comments, although personal, became public by virtue of his status.
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It is also important to note that requiring the media to "sort through
an inventory of facts to deliberate, and to catalogue each of them according to their individual and cumulative impact under all circumstances,
would impose an impossible task...." See Star Telegram, Inc. v. Doe,
915 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tex. 1995). The same is true in the instant case:
HackLibrary should not have to deliberate through each individual fact
hidden in the HTML source code and determine the weight. Requiring
HackLibrary to do so would effectively cripple its ability to provide newsworthy information to the public for academic and research purposes.
HackLibrary is clearly not liable for invasion of Petitioner's right to
privacy. HackLibrary merely displayed and archived information that
was available in the public domain, whether in public records or other
reference sources. Furthermore, if the existence of the TERRORISTZ
website on the original ChiPost.com website, which averages thousands
of visitors each hour, was not enough to render the information public,
then maintenance and archiving of TERRORISTZ in HackLibrary to a
limited, specialized audience is insufficient to constitute publicity.
Further, the information archived was not offensive to the reasonable person because if Petitioner were truly offended, then he would have
petitioned the appropriate courts to seal the records and redact personal
information from other public sources. Finally, the hacking of websites,
especially of a major newspaper, is newsworthy and of legitimate public
concern. As such, Petitioner's personal information was necessary to
maintain the integrity of the report on hacking.
Summary judgment is most appropriate in the instant case to avoid
a chilling effect on HackLibrary's right to display and archive newsworthy information. Therefore, this Court should affirm the First District Court of Appeals' grant of summary judgment in favor of
HackLibrary on the invasion of privacy claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent, HackLibrary Inc., respectfully requests that this Court reinstate the Madison County Circuit
Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of HackLibrary on the statutory immunity issue and affirm the First District Court of Appeals
grant of summary judgment on the invasion of privacy issue.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Respondent
Alice Sum
Christine Lent
Kimberly Gilyard
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APPENDICES
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Code Annotated, Title 11 Bankruptcy
§ 107. Public Access to Papers
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a paper filed in a
case under this title and the dockets of a bankruptcy court are pubic
records and open to examination by an entity at reasonable times without charge.
(b) On request of a party in interest, the bankruptcy court shall, and on
the bankruptcy court's own motion, the bankruptcy court may(1) protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential
research, development, or commercial information; or,
(2) protect a person with respect to scandalous or defamatory matter
contained in a paper filed in a case under this title.
Communications Decency Act, 47 United States Code Annotated
§ 230 Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material.

(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States-

(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize
user control over what information is received by individuals, families,
and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer
services;

(c) Protection for "good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive
material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker
of any information provided by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of -
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(a) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected; or
(b) any action taken to enable or make available to information
content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).

(f) Definitions

(2) Interactive computer service. The term "interactive computer
service" means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by
libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider. The term "information content
provider" means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided through
the Internet or any other interactive computer service.
Florida Statutes Chapter 119
§ 119.011 Definitions - for the purpose of this chapter:
(1) "Public records" means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books,
tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data processing software, or
other material, regardless of the physical form, characteristics, or means
of transmission, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency.
West's Annotated California Government Code
§ 6250 Legislative findings and declarations
In enacting this chapter, the Legislature, mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning
the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental necessary right of
every person in this state.
West's Smith-Hurd Illinois Compiled Statutes Annotated
Chapter 750. Families
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§ 105. Application of Civil Practice Law
(a) The provisions of the Civil Practice Law shall apply to all proceedings
under this Act, except as otherwise provided in this Act.
(b) A proceeding for dissolution of marriage, legal separation or declaration of invalidity of marriage shall be entitled "In re the Marriage of
and
" A custody or support proceeding shall be
entitled "In re the (Custody) (Support) of
(c) The initial pleading in all proceedings under this Act shall be denominated a petition. A responsive pleading shall be denominated a response. All other pleadings under this Act shall be denominated as
provided in the Civil Practice Law.
Florida Statutes, Chapter 61 Dissolution of Marriage; Support;

Custody
§61.043 Commencement of proceeding for dissolution of marriage
or for alimony and child support.
A proceeding for dissolution of marriage or proceeding under §61.09 shall
be commenced by filing in the circuit court a petition entitled "In re the
marriage of
, husband, and
wife." A copy of the petition together with a copy of a summons shall be served upon the other
party to the marriage in the same manner as service of papers in civil
actions generally.
_,

Restatement (Second) Torts §652D
PUBLICITY GIVEN TO PRIVATE LIFE
(a) Publicity. The form of invasion of the right of privacy covered in
this Section depends upon publicity given to the private life of the individual. "Publicity," as it is used in this Section, differs from "publication," as that term is used in s 577 in connection with liability for
defamation. "Publication," in that sense, is a word of art, which includes
any communication by the defendant to a third person. "Publicity," on
the other hand, means that the matter is made public, by communicating
it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.
The difference is not one of the means of communication, which may be
oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a communication that
reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.
Thus it is not an invasion of the right of privacy, within the rule stated in
this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life
to a single person or even to a small group of persons. On the other
hand, any publication in a newspaper or a magazine, even of small circulation, or in a handbill distributed to a large number of persons, or any
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broadcast over the radio, or statement made in an address to a large
audience, is sufficient to give publicity within the meaning of the term as
it is used in this Section. The distinction, in other words, is one between
private and public communication.
(b) Private life. The rule stated in this Section applies only to publicity given to matters concerning the private, as distinguished from the
public, life of the individual. There is no liability when the defendant
merely gives further publicity to facts about the plaintiffs life that is
already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts
about the plaintiffs life that are matters of public record, such as the
date of his birth, the fact of his marriage, his military record, the fact
that he is admitted to the practice of medicine or is licensed to drive a
taxicab, or the pleadings that he has filed in a lawsuit. On the other
hand, if the record is one not open to public inspection, as in the case of
income tax returns, it is not public, and there is an invasion of privacy
when it is made so.
Similarly, there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the
plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye. Thus he normally cannot
complain when his photograph is taken while he is walking down the
public street and is published in the defendant's newspaper. Nor is his
privacy invaded when the defendant gives publicity to a business or activity in which the plaintiff is engaged in dealing with the public. On the
other hand, when a photograph is taken without the plaintiffs consent in
a private place, or one already made is stolen from his home, the plaintiffs appearance that is made public when the picture appears in a newspaper is still a private matter, and his privacy is invaded.
Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and some
facts about himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps
entirely to himself or at most reveals only to his family or to close
friends. Sexual relations, for example, are normally entirely private
matters, as are family quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses, most intimate personal letters, most details of a
man's life in his home, and some of his past history that he would rather
forget. When these intimate details of his life are spread before the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man,
there is an actionable invasion of his privacy, unless the matter is one of
legitimate public interest.
(c) Highly offensive publicity. The rule stated in this Section gives
protection only against unreasonable publicity, of a kind highly offensive
to the ordinary reasonable man. The protection afforded to the plaintiffs
interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and
place, to the occupation of the plaintiff s of his neighbors and fellow citizens. Complete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert,
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and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary
incidents of the community life of which he is a part. Thus he must expect the more or less casual observation of his neighbors as to what he
does, and that his comings and goings and his ordinary daily activities,
will be described in the press as a matter of casual interest to others.
The ordinary reasonable man does not take offense at a report in a newspaper that he has returned from a visit, gone camping in the woods or
given a party at his house for his friends. Even minor and moderate
annoyance, as for example through public disclosure of the fact that the
plaintiff has clumsily fallen downstairs and broken his ankle, is not sufficient to give him a cause of action under the rule stated in this Section.
It is only when the publicity given to him is such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it, that the cause
of action arises.
(d) Matter of legitimate public concern. When the matter to which
publicity is given is true, it is not enough that the publicity would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person. The common law has long recognized that the public has a proper interest in learning about many matters. When the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public
concern, there is no invasion of privacy.
This has now become a rule not just of the common law of torts, but of
the Federal Constitution as well. In the case of Cox Broadcasting Co. v.
Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469, the Supreme Court indicated that an action
for invasion of privacy cannot be maintained when the subject-matter of
the publicity is a matter of "legitimate concern to the public." The Court
held specifically that the "States may not impose sanctions for the publication of truthful information contained in official court records open to
public inspection.' Other language indicates that this position applies to
public records in general.
It seems clear that the common law restrictions on recovery for publicity
given to a matter of proper public interest will now become a part of the
constitutional law of freedom of the press and freedom of speech. To the
extent that the constitutional definition of a matter that is of legitimate
concern to the public is broader than the definition given in any State,
the constitutional definition will of course control. In the absence of additional holdings of the Supreme Court, the succeeding Comments are
based on decisions at common law.
(f) Involuntary public figures. There are other individuals who have
not sought publicity or consented to it, but through their own conduct or
otherwise have become a legitimate subject of public interest. They
have, in other words, become "news." Those who commit crime or are
accused of it may not only not seek publicity but may make every possible effort to avoid it, but they are nevertheless persons of public interest,
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concerning whom the public is entitled to be informed. The same is true
as to those who are the victims of crime or are so unfortunate as to be
present when it is committed, as well as those who are the victims of
catastrophes or accidents or are involved in judicial proceedings or other
events that attract public attention. These persons are regarded as properly subject to the public interest, and publishers are permitted to satisfy
the curiosity of the public as to its heroes, leaders, villains and victims,
and those who are closely associated with them. As in the case of the
voluntary public figure, the authorized publicity is not limited to the
event that itself arouses the public interest, and to some reasonable extent includes publicity given to facts about the individual that would
otherwise be purely private. (See Comment g).
(g) News. Included within the scope of legitimate public concern are
matters of the kind customarily regarded as "news." To a considerable
extent, in accordance with the mores of the community, the publishers
and broadcasters have themselves defined the term, as a glance at any
morning paper will confirm. Authorized publicity includes publications
concerning homicide and other crimes, arrests, police raids, suicides,
marriages and divorces, accidents, fires, catastrophes of nature, a death
from the use of narcotics, a rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelveyear-old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered
years ago, a report to the police concerning the escape of a wild animal
and many other similar matters of genuine, even if more or less
deplorable, popular appeal.
(h) Private facts. Permissible publicity to information concerning
either voluntary or involuntary public figures is not limited to the particular events that arouse the interest of the public. That interest, once
aroused by the event, may legitimately extend, to some reasonable degree, to further information concerning the individual and to facts about
him, which are not public and which, in the case of one who had not
become a public figure, would be regarded as an invasion of his purely
private life. Thus the life history of one accused of murder, together with
such heretofore private facts as may throw some light upon what kind of
person he is, his possible guilt or innocence, or his reasons for committing the crime, are a matter of legitimate public interest. (See Illustration 13 above). On the same basis the home life and daily habits of a
motion picture actress may be of legitimate and reasonable interest to
the public that sees her on the screen.
The extent of the authority to make public private facts is not, however,
unlimited. There may be some intimate details of her life, such as sexual
relations, which even the actress is entitled to keep to herself. In determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account must be
taken of the customs and conventions of the community; and in the last
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analysis what is proper becomes a matter of the community mores. The
line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable
member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no
concern. The limitations, in other words, are those of common decency,
having due regard to the freedom of the press and its reasonable leeway
to choose what it will tell the public, but also due regard to the feelings of
the individual and the harm that will be done to him by the exposure.
Some reasonable proportion is also to be maintained between the event
or activity that makes the individual a public figure and the private facts
to which publicity is given. Revelations that may properly be made concerning a murderer or the President of the United States would not be
privileged if they were to be made concerning one who is merely injured
in an automobile accident.
(j) Education and information. The scope of a matter of legitimate
concern to the public is not limited to "news," in the sense of reports of
current events or activities. It extends also to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be
expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.
47 U.S.C.A. §153
§ 153. Definitions
For the purposes of this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-

(20) Information service
The term "information service" means the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and
includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such
capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.
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